GERMAN POLITICKS,

OR, THE

MODERN SYSTEM

Examined and *Refuted*;

WHEREIN

The Natural Strength of GERMANY and FRANCE are compared;

The Nature of the BALLANCE of POWER explained;

And our Inability to maintain, in our present Circumstances, a War on the Continent, is demonstrated.

To which is added, a

POSTSCRIPT.

First Printed in the Year 1745.

Britannia *servitutem suam quotidie emit, quotidie posuit.*
Tacit. in vita Agricolæ.

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

THE

PREFACE.

WHEN this Pamphlet was firſt publiſhed, thoſe who diſliked it, treated all that was predicted therein, as to the future Conduct of the Germans, *in the Light of improbable Conjectures, or of malicious Suggeſtions. But Time, the true Teſt of Politicks, has juſtified every Thing the Reader will find in the following Sheets advanced; from whence it will appear how eaſy a Thing it was, even for Politicians without Places or Pen-*

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ſions, to foreſee the Turn that Affairs would take, and the Neceſſity there was of not ſtraining Things high, merely to oblige a particular Court. But what ſuch diſintereſted and uncharactered People diſcourſed on ſuch Subjects went for nothing; the ſame Scheme of Politicks was purſued, and while we gloried in placing a new Emperor on the Throne of Germany; France, *in her Turn, made a fair Puſh for placing a Viceroy here.*

This was ſurely the ſtrongeſt Evidence that could be deſired of our playing too high a Game, and riſquing more than we could afford. Such as are truly loyal to the preſent Government, *and have a juſt Senſe of the Bleſſings we owe to our preſent happy Eſtabliſhment, muſt be ſatisfied, that in riſquing that, we not only did more than could be expected from us; but even more than we can juſtify to ourſelves, or to our Poſterity. For I crave leave to ſay,*

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and I believe there is no Engliſh-man *will think I carry the Matter too far in ſo ſaying, that the Laws, Liberties and Properties of this Nation, ought not to be put in Jeopardy from any Conſideration whatever, let it regard whom it would. This is and was always reaſonable; this every true Patriot, every honeſt well-meaning* Briton, *knew and thought before he had the Light of Experience to guide him; and I dare ſay, is ſincerely ſorry to ſee his Opinion juſtified at ſo high a Price to his Country, as the Rebellion firſt and laſt has coſt.*

But it may be ſaid, that though this was foreſeen it could not be avoided. To which I anſwer, it might. Once it was in our Power, and we neglected it. Afterwards we put it in the Power of our Allies, and they let it ſlip; which is the leſs wonderful, ſince no true Politician, could ever expect that any other Power ſhould pay a greater Attention

tion to the Intereſts of this Nation, than ſhe thought fit to do to her own. But that I may not be charged with talking myſteriouſly, or confining myſelf to general Terms, I will explain what I mean, as I think an honeſt Man ought to do, and one who has nothing but the Intereſt of his Country in view, has a right to do.

In few Words then, my Meaning is this. We had it in our own Power, and to ſecure the Intereſt of the Britiſh *Nation, ſo long ago, as when the late Emperor offered to make Peace upon our own Terms. If that Offer had been of no Conſequence, why was he invited to* Francfort, *why treated with at all? If it was of Conſequence, and if a good Peace might have been made at that Time, why was it not made? This is a Queſtion that concerns us nearly: For if a Peace had been then made, moſt certain it is, that the Rebellion had never happen'd, the Publick Credit of the Nation had never been affected;*

ed; nor had we, or our neceſſary Allies the Dutch, *been in the Circumſtances, which we find ourſelves in at this Day.*

The other Opportunity I mentioned, was on conluding the Convention of Hanover *with the King of* Pruſſia. *If the Empreſs Queen of* Hungary *had cloſed with it immediately, and not waited for thoſe Events which forced her to cloſe with it at laſt, by the Treaty lately concluded at* Dreſden; *many Things muſt have happened, which would have put our Affairs, her Affairs, and the Affairs of all the Allies, in a Situation very different from that which they are now in. In the firſt Place, the* French *King durſt neither have ſupported, nor have avowed, the Cauſe of the Rebels. In the next, the* Spaniards *and their Allies had never prevailed, as they have in in* Italy. *And laſtly, not to tire the Reader with Particulars, there had been at this Hour, ſuch an Army*

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in the Low-Countries, *as would at leaſt have prevented the* French *from from making any farther Conqueſts, perhaps inclined them to have parted with thoſe they made laſt Campaign. But* German *Politicks prevented this; and the plain Inference is, that for this Reaſon we ought to grow wiſe at laſt, and truſt to* Britiſh, *not* German, *Politicks for the future.*

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GERMAN POLITICKS.

THERE are certain Seaſons when not to be Serious, is not to be Senſible; not to conſider Publick Affairs, is to be inexcuſably Careleſs and Indolent; and not to follow the Lights we receive, is to be Puſilanimous and Diſhoneſt. Such a Seaſon I take the preſent to be; we have already raiſed as many Taxes as well can be raiſed, which I prove from the Mortgaging the Sinking Fund; that can be juſtified from no other Cauſe. We are in Debt as much as we well can be, as is evident from our parting with the very Equity of Redemption, and taking up upon that, which was deſigned for paying off our old Scores. We are in Difficulties enough with one War, and yet are threatned with much greater, in Caſe, under our preſent Circumſtances, we ſhould venture upon another. Such is our Condition, and therefore if ever we are to think, if ever we are to employ our Underſtandings, if ever we are to act like wiſe Men, or to behave like People that know what they are about, this is the Time. If we ſleep now, we had as good never wake; if we do not exert ourſelves at this Criſis, we may, indeed, have time enough for Repentance, but the Seaſon of Amendment will be paſſed; we may deplore our paſt Conduct, but that will not recall it; we may weep for our Folly, but we ſhall never be comforted; the

Staff will be out of our Hands, and we ſhall find ourſelves, where many fooliſh Nations have been found before, in the Gulph of Political Deſpair.

As a Man muſt be arrived at a very hardened State, who does not tremble at the Apprehenſion of ſeeing his Country in ſuch a Situation, ſo I think we can never pay too great a Tribute of Praiſe to our preſent Governors, who have left it in the Power of every Man to ſpeak his Sentiments freely in ſuch a Juncture, and have choſen rather to bear indecent Reflections upon themſelves, than in the midſt of ſo many, and ſo great, Dangers to curb the Liberty of the Preſs, by which alone we can hope to be quickened to a proper Senſe of our Condition. I know there are ſome who give another Turn to this, but for my Part, as I am conſcious of no other Motive, to the uſing this Liberty, than the Deſire I have of acquitting myſelf to my Country, ſo I ſhall always eſteem it the higheſt Act of Injuſtice to aſcribe that to a wrong Principle, which ſeems to flow more naturally from a right one; and under a juſt Senſe of this, I preſume our great Men ſhew ſo much Indulgence to the Preſs, and I ſhall uſe it in that way, and with all the Freedom, which can be expected, from one who knows no Party, owns no Patron but the Publick, who has been for many Years a ſtudious Obſerver of what paſt on the great Theatre of the World, and who was never in ſo much Pain about any Tranſaction he beheld thereon, as he is at preſent.

There is undoubtedly in private Life no Character more unworthy of Love, more juſtly or more generally puniſhed with Hate, than Selfiſhneſs, and yet ſomewhat of this Nature is abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve a Power of being otherwiſe; he who is careleſs of his own Concerns,

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will ſoon have it out of his Power to relieve, how much Feeling ſoever he may have for the Wants of others. It is the ſame Thing with Nations, if they Regard nothing but their own Intereſt, they will neceſſarily become Hateful and Hated, they will provoke the Envy of their Neighbours, and their own Conduct will afford ſuch Colours for attacking and deſtroying them, as will give a Shew of Juſtice even to the Work of Malice. This was the Caſe of the *Carthaginians*, they were Selfiſh to the laſt Degree, and this made them moſt aſſiduous in their Commerce, this again made them Rich, when they were ſo they grew Proud and Inſolent, which naturally brought on them Difficulties, Diſtreſſes, and in the end Deſtruction. But though Selfiſhneſs be ſo bad an Ingredient in Policy, when it is there in too great a Degree, yet we muſt take Care not to leave it totally out; a Nation prodigal in ſupporting others, and vainly fond of having fine Things ſaid to her by her Neighbours, may be led into ſuch Expences, as it is out of her Power to ſupport, may even in a juſt Cauſe be drawn to Ruin by Profuſion, and be undone herſelf by a prepoſterous Deſire of ſaving Others. This was the Caſe of *Sweden* under *Charles* XII. He was not content with repreſſing Acts of Hoſtility againſt his own Kingdom, he would needs be the Protector of diſtreſſed Princes, and the Saviour of enſlaved Nations; nay, at laſt he extended his Care of Mankind ſo far as to ſet up like another *Hercules* for the pulling down of Tyrants; but his firſt Expedition, in that way, proved his laſt, his generous Enthuſiaſm undid him, and which was worſe ſtill undid his Subjects.

We ſee therefore, that Moderation is alike neceſſary in all Things, and that it is a Rule in Policy, as well as Prudence, not to be Righteous

overmuch, that is, not to be madly and fantaſtically deſirous of obtaining all the World's good Word, and being ſo perfectly diſintereſted out of a Thirſt of Praiſe, as to forgo that Profit, which is neceſſary for our own Preſervation. It is juſt, it is laudable, to have a hearty Concern for the Welfare of our Neighbours, but the very Reaſon that convinces us of this, convinces us much more ſtrongly, that it is not either juſt or laudable to be negligent of our ſelves. Yet ſo it is, that while Chriſtianity ſeems, and I am very ſorry to ſay it, to have but little Influence over the Conduct of Individuals, its Maxims, over-ſtrained, ſeem to be the Rudiments of Modern Politicks; for otherwiſe, how ſhould it come to paſs, that in Order to be thought true *Britons*, and good Subjects, we are enjoined, over and above our Affection for our King and Country, to love certain Neighbours of ours, not only as well, but better than ourſelves. Charity is moſt certainly an excellent Thing, but even with Reſpect to that, there is an old Proverb, and a true one, that *Charity begins at Home*. If I am ill of a Fever, my Neighbour has no right to expect that I ſhould go to ſee him, becauſe he has got a Cold, much leſs, that I ſhould ſend him my Apothecary and Phyſician, and pay thoſe he thinks fit to call, when I have infinitely more need of Medicines than He. If a Man is weak enough to call this Charity, I don't doubt but he may find Neighbours wiſe enough to ſooth him in his Folly, and to keep him running about, as long as he has Strength to ſtand upon his Legs; but I know what his Family will think all the while; and I know that the Caſe is much the ſame, if transferred from a Man to a Nation.

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We have for a Century laſt paſt, been extremely puzzled, as to the proper Rule of our Behaviour, towards a certain Thing called the Ballance of *Europe*; ſometimes riſking all for its Service has been eſteemed the higheſt Point of Heroiſm, at other Times it has been regarded as downright Knight-Errantry; and as the oppoſite Parties prevailed, Men have been admired and laughed at by turns, for their Attachment to, or Contempt of this Principle. Nay at this very Hour, ſome are wiſe Men and Fools, Saints and Devils, Patriots and Traytors, in different Companies, merely as People's Notions vary, about the Importance of this ſame Ballance of ower. Of late Years indeed our Notions have grown narrower in this, as in moſt other Reſpects, and inſtead of the Ballance of Power in *Europe*, we have chiefly confined our Cares to the Ballance of Power in *Germany*. If this has been preſerved, all in the Opinion of our moſt knowing People, went well, but if ever it tottered, or through our being at ſo great a Diſtance, if we but apprehended it to totter, then were we to run one and all to ſet it ſtrait, to ſhift the Weights in the ſeveral Scales, 'till we thought it ſtood even, and upon this perhaps ſome of our Neighbours, who were nearer, thought it awry, and then to tugging went they, which brought us into the Scrape again. Thus we have gone on, and thus we are like to go on, to the no ſmall Sorrow of ſome, who think we are quite miſtaken in our Notions about this Matter, and that if we do not ſpeedily diſcover our Miſtake, we may bring ourſelves into ſuch a Condition, as may render all Diſcoveries too late.

I know the Riſk a Man runs of being thought a Tory, a Jacobite, or an Incendiary, for talking at this Rate; but I know that a Man muſt always

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riſk ſomething who will defend the Truth, an therefore I give myſelf no great Concern about what People may call me, in Conſequence of my Writing this Pamphlet. I have ſtudied this Point with Labour and Diligence, and I am fully ſatisfied, I can ſet it in a true Light, that is to ſay, I can point out that middle Path, that Road of Moderation, in which we ought to tread, if we have any Regard for ourſelves, as well as for the *Germans*; by treading in which we may ſave ourſelves, and do them good at the ſame Time, and out of which if we are once carried by any ſort of Political Enthuſiaſm, we ſhall be certainly undone, and then who will take Care of the Ballance of Power in *Germany*, who will be ſollicitous for the Safety of lower *Saxony*, who will be Protectors of the *Land* of the *Elect*, when we are gone? Let them think of this who take no care of us; let them who have ſuch Tenderneſs for our half Brethren, have ſome Bowels for thoſe of the whole Blood; let Common-Senſe ſupply the Place of Natural Affection, and if not to Prudence, let us owe our Safety to Cunning at leaſt. Now to make all this evident, and to leave no *Engliſhman* who will take the pains to conſider, and who has Senſe enough to underſtand a Thing of this Nature when he has conſidered it, the very leaſt Reaſon to to doubt about it, I ſhall proceed to examine the Three following Points.

Firſt, I ſhall conſider the Ancient State of *Germany*, what was heretofore underſtood by the Ballance of Power in that Part of *Europe*, and the Concern their Neighbours had for it. The Power that the *German* Princes had in thoſe early Days, the Uſes they made of it, and in Conſequence thereof the Figure they made, and the Rank they ſtood in, with Regard to the other

Powers

Powers of *Europe*, but particularly with Regard to *England*.

Secondly, I ſhall apply myſelf to the Examination of the preſent State of *Germany*, with Regard to the ſame Points, more eſpecially the Ballance of Power there; the Grandeur of the *Imperial* and *Electoral* Dignities; the Capacity of the *Germanic* Body to reſiſt, or if they find it neceſſary to reduce the Power of *France*; and the Relation which in its preſent Circumſtances that Country has, or may be ſuppoſed to have to *Britain*.

Laſtly, I ſhall take Notice of the ancient and preſent Circumſtances of the Inhabitants of this Iſland, as well in Regard to their Properties and Commerce, as to their Intereſt in Reſpect to their Concerns on the Continent, and that great Concern of all the Ballance of Power in *Europe*; with ſome Thoughts as to what it has coſt us, what it may coſt us, and what at this Juncture we may be able to expend about it.

Cluverius, who has written with great Learning and Judgment the Hiſtory of the ancient *Germans*, has very fully ſhewn, that, all Circumſtances conſidered, the Nation inhabiting this vaſt Tract of Country, made a greater Figure in thoſe early Days, than ſhe does now, having frequently extended her Conqueſts on every ſide, and Peopling by this means moſt of the Northern and Weſtern Parts of *Europe*. The ancient *Germans* were, as all Writers agree, a Generous, Brave and Gallant People, paſſionately fond of Liberty, and who were content to be free, in a very indifferent Country, rather than riſk being Slaves, by ſubmitting themſelves ſo abſolutely to the Will and Direction of a ſingle Perſon, as was requiſite in order to conquer a better. In Proceſs of Time

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their Manners and their Form of Government altered, and which is a little extraordinary it has now and then reverted to its firſt Principles. For Inſtance, the Original Government of the *German* Nations, like the Original Government of our own Iſland, was by petty Princes who governed their little Sovereignties, not at Will, but according to a Scheme of Laws, ſanctified by common Conſent, with an Occaſional Dependance, on a ſupreme Chief, or great Commander, who in Times of Difficulty was choſen to a Sort of Dictatorſhip. *Charles* the Great, and the Emperors his Succeſſors, were however Princes of another Sort, for they poſſeſſed a Kind of abſolute Dominion; but finding it neceſſary to appoint ſeveral Officers, ſome for executing Juſtice, and others for directing Military Affairs; and diſpoſing of theſe as they thought convenient, in the ſeveral Provinces of their Empire, theſe Officers by Degrees enlarged their Power, tranſmitted it to their Deſcendants, and eſtabliſhed again, in a great meaſure, that very Kind of Government, which at firſt prevailed.

As Powerful as theſe ancient Emperors were, and as much as they were inclined to aſſume to themſelves the Prerogatives of the *Roman* Monarchs, whom they pretended to ſucceed, yet they were not able to give Law to their Neighbours, notwithſtanding the vaſt Extent of Territory they poſſeſſed, and the great military Power, which they had always in their Hands. *Charles* the Great, who was Maſter of *Germany*, *France*, *Italy* and Part of *Spain*, made a League with the *Scots*; and when he attempted to preſcribe Bounds to one of our *Saxon* Princes, he treated that Interpoſition with Contempt, and the Emperor was afterwards glad to court his Friendſhip. When the

the Empire became Elective, it was an Honour to which Princes of all Countries aſpired, and amongſt the reſt the *Engliſh*. *Richard* Duke of *Cornwall*, Son to King *John*, and Brother to *Henry* III. was crowned Emperor at *Aix la Chapelle*, on the 2d of *May*, 1257, and this Piece of Vanity coſt the Nation immenſe Sums of Money, of which when the *Germans* had got all they could, they fairly turn'd him out; and having likewiſe drained conſiderable Sums from *Alphonſo*, ſurnamed the wiſe King of *Caſtile*, they ſet up *Rodolph* Count of *Hapsburgh*, from whom the Houſe of *Auſtria* are deſcended. He was ſucceeded by *Adolphus* Count of *Naſſau*, who was oppoſed by *Albert* Son to the late Emperor, and we took Part in the Quarrel; *Adolphus* ſerved in our Army againſt the *French*, and at that Time we were weak enough to put our ſelves to a vaſt Expence, to enable that Emperor to recover the Kingdom of *Arles*: For this Purpoſe we ſent over to the Emperor *Adolph*, a vaſt Sum of Money, to raiſe Troops for the Support of the common Cauſe, which he employed in the Purchaſe of *Thuringia*, for his Family; and *Albert* of *Auſtria* taking Advantage of this wrong Step, and being powerfully ſupported by *France*, attacked, defeated and killed the Emperor *Adolph*. On the Death of *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, the Electors choſe *Edward* III. King of *England*, but he was too wiſe a Prince to be cheated by the Shadow of a Sovereignty, or to run into any Expences about it; and therefore he wiſely declined accepting this Offer, that he might not embarraſs himſelf, or exhauſt his Subjects. Throughout this Period of Time, the Policy of the *German* Princes, was plainly directed to the ſingle Point of making the moſt of the Imperial Diadem, by offering it to ſuch foreign

Princes as were remarkable for their Ambition and Wealth; and as ſoon as they had extracted as much from them as they could, they always found ſome Pretence or other for ſetting up a Countryman of their own, under whoſe Protection they might enjoy the Riches derived to them, in this Manner, from other Nations; until ſuch Time as the Houſe of *Auſtria* became ſo powerful, as to put an end to theſe Sort of Practices, by aſſuming a new Kind of Influence, which though it left the Appearance of Election, ſecured an Hereditary Deſcent of the Imperial Dignity in their Family.

I am very far from blaming this Diſpoſition in the *German* Princes, becauſe it was founded on a Spirit of true Patriotiſm, by which they converted all Things to the Service of their Country; in which they ſought, by all the Methods poſſible, to fix the Power and Riches of *Europe:* A Principle from which they have never hitherto varied, farther than the Viciſſitudes natural to ſublunary Things have rendered it neceſſary; and in theſe Variations, they have ſhewn ſuch Prudence, ſuch Firmneſs, and ſuch Warmth of publick Spirit, as not not only extremely commendable, but worthy alſo of Imitation; that is, not to Diſguiſe my Thoughts, it ought to put other Nations on acting upon the like Principles, that they may preſerve and promote their own Happineſs. It was from this Motive, that in the thirteenth Century, ſeveral free Cities in *Germany*, by leaguing themſelves together, created that ſurprizing Republick, intitled the *Teutonic Hanſe*, by which they engroſſed all the Trade of *Europe*, for above two hundred Years, to themſelves. It is indeed a great pity that we have not a clear and diſtinct Hiſtory of this wonderful Aſſociation, which does more Honour to Commerce,

Commerce, than any Thing we met with either in Ancient or Modern Hiſtory; the Power, Influence and Riches of *Tyre*, *Carthage*, *Venice*, *Genoa*, and *Holland* not excepted. By the prudent Regulations of the *German Hanſe* Towns, they not only ſecured all the Trade of their own Country to themſelves, and managed that of the *North*, without Rivals, but they likewiſe aſſociated Foreign Cities ſo as to have the Direction of Trade every where, bnt particularly here, where their Privileges were ſo extenſive, that it was with great Difficulty the Natives broke through them; and nothing but the Spirit of *Henry* VIII. and the Wiſdom of ſome Counſellors about his Son *Edward* VI. could have delivered us from their Oppreſſion, or opened a Paſſage for the *Engliſh* Traders, to export their own Commodities and Manufactures, or import thoſe of foreign Countries freely, without paying ſuch exorbitant Tribute, to theſe *German* Monopolizers, as was abſolutely inconſiſtent with our Intereſt as a free People, and a trading Nation. Such as are curious may apply themſelves for Information to *Strype*'s Memorials, *Hollingſhead*, and other Writers, who have recorded, though very imperfectly, the Struggles of our Anceſtors upon this Subject. From hence it clearly appears how deep Reach the *Germans* have always had, and now zealouſly they have bent their Endeavours to aggrandize themſelves at the Expence of other Nations, and to bind them by Treaties, Alliances, Charters, and every other poſſible Method, to ſacrifice their own natural Intereſt, to their Friendſhip for the *German* People. In the Reign of Queen *Elizabeth*, the Power of the *Hanſe* Towns was upon the decline, and yet their Spirit remained unbroken; they ſaw, and took Advantage of

her Difficulties, they aſſiſted the *Spaniards* againſt her, by every Method they could deviſe, by furniſhing them with Proviſions, Artillery, Ammunition, Tranſports, and even Ships of War, at the ſame Time, that under Pretence of there being no War between *England* and the *Empire*, they would have protected their Subjects and Veſſels, as if they had belonged to a Neutral State. But that wiſe Princeſs was not to be terrified or cheated; ſhe bore with theſe Grievances at firſt, 'till by the Exerciſe of a Naval War, ſhe had raiſed a conſiderable Maritime Power, and then ſhe treated thoſe People as they deſerved, ordering her Admirals to ſink, burn, and take all ſuch Veſſels belonging to the *Hanſe* Towns, as they ſhould find in the Service of the King of *Spain*, or his Subjects; and they executed this with ſuch Vigour and Activity, as ſoon put it out of the Power of the *Hanſe* Towns to ſhew their Malice towards her Government, by any other Methods than grumbling, complaining, and exciting the States of the Empire againſt her, which gave that Queen an Opportunity of extinguiſhing all their Privileges here, and of engaging moſt of the *German* Merchants ſettled in her Dominions, to enter into the *Engliſh* Companies of Commerce, which ſhe erected, and which gave the laſt Blow to *German* Tyranny, and effectually eſtabliſhed our own Navigation.

The Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria* came to its Height under *Charles* V. who was at the ſame time King of *Spain*, Sovereign of great Part of *Italy*, and all the Low Countries. The Conduct of this Prince, changed the whole Syſtem of *Germany*; for as he had nothing at Heart but the Grandeur of his Family, which led him to Meaſures directly repugnant to the Intereſt of the Empire,

Empire, ſo the *German* Princes grew extremely uneaſy at the extravagant Growth of his Power, as well as at the ill Uſe, they thought, he made of it. The Religious Diſturbances that then broke out, afforded Pretences for both Parties to aſſociate and arm themſelves, for the Defence of their reſpective Cauſes. The Proteſtants entered into a defenſive Alliance at *Smalkald*, which in the Year 1535 was renewed, and had then ſo formidable an Appearance, that the Emperor could not forbear teſtifying his Reſolution to diſſolve it. The Proteſtants, under *John Frederick* Elector of *Saxony*, and *Philip* Landgrave of *Heſſe*, immediately took the Field with 100,000 Men, and if they had attacked the Emperor with the ſame Expedition, they had, in all Probability, effectually ſecured both their civil and eccleſiaſtical Liberties, againſt the arbitrary Deſigns of that tyrannical and fraudulent Prince. But their Slowneſs gave him Time, not only to raiſe a puiſſant Army, but to create a dangerous Diverſion, by the Help of *Maurice* of *Saxony*, Couſin to the Elector; ſo that the next Year, the Emperor beat the laſt-mentioned Prince, in a deciſive Battle, near *Muhlbergh*, and took him Priſoner; proceeding afterwards with ſuch Severity, as to paſs on him Sentence of Death; and the Landgrave of *Heſſe*, having ſubmitted himſelf upon the Emperor's Faith, was in Breach of it, put in Priſon.

This Defeat of the Proteſtants, gave the Emperor the Opportunity he wanted, of ſecuring the Poſſeſſions of his Family, at the Expence of the *German* Intereſt; for in the Year 1548 he engaged or rather forced the States of the Empire, to take upon them the Guaranty of the Circle of *Burgundy*, which comprehended not only the Dutchy and County of that Name, but alſo all the

Low

Low Countries; involving the Empire, thereby, in all the Diſputes that afterwards happened between the *Spaniſh* Branch of his Family, and the *French*, about thoſe Provinces, with which they would otherwiſe have had nothing to do. And in Virtue of this Guaranty, it is that Colonel *Mentzel*, in his late Manifeſto, threatens to detach from the *French* Monarchy the *Franche-Comte*, and the Dutchy of *Burgundy*, as having been diſmembered from the Empire; though the Reader will obſerve, that the placing them under the Protection of the Empire, was in Effect, a Force upon the States, and brought about entirely by the Policy and Puiſſance of this mighty Prince, who therein conſidered the Safety of his own Family, rather than the Intereſt of the *Germanic* Body. But as all great Oppreſſions of a Nation, naturally powerful, have a direct Tendency to excite their own Redreſs, by ſtirring up great Men to thoſe Remedies, which the Nature of the Caſe ſhew can alone prove ſucceſsful; ſo the *German* Princes, and eſpecially the Proteſtants, finding themſelves in Circumſtances ſo uneaſy, and fearing that the Emperor would proceed to ſtill greater Lengths, reſolved to have recourſe once more to Arms. In this Enterprize they had for their Chief, that very *Maurice* Elector of *Saxony*, who became ſo by the Favour of the Emperor, in Prejudice of his Couſin the Elector *John Frederick*; and as *Maurice* ſaw the miſchievous Conſequences of the dilatory Conduct of the Allies of *Smalkald*, he took his Meaſures ſo ſecretly and ſucceſsfully, that he very narrowly miſſed ſeizing the Emperor at *Inſpruck*, from whence he fled away by Torch-Light. This Blow had a terrible Effect upon the Emperor's Affairs, who found himſelf obliged to compromiſe Matters with the Proteſtants, by the Treaty

ty of *Paſſau*: In this Diſpute the Confederates made uſe of the Aſſiſtance of *Henry* the Second of *France*, but as they took no Care of his Intereſt, in making this Peace, he ſeized *Metz*, *Toul* and *Verdun*, which the *French* have kept ever ſince; and for the Recovery of which, Colonel *Mentzel* declares in his Manifeſto, that the Allies were advancing towards the Frontiers of *France*; thus the Reader perceives that the *German* Empire ſuffered this great Diminution of Power and Territory from the exorbitant Ambition of the Houſe of *Auſtria*.

The Affairs of *Germany* during the Reigns of the ſucceeding Emperors, *Ferdinand*, *Maximilian*, and *Rodolph*, went ſmoothly enough; for the Houſe of *Auſtria* being now parted into two Branches, the *Germans* were the better ſatisfied with the Imperial Line. But the Emperor *Matthias*, a bold, enterpriſing and ambitious Prince, and withal a great Enemy to the Proteſtants, took ſuch Meaſures, as made the Wounds of *Germany* break out a-freſh, in the famous War of thirty Years, waged chiefly by the *Calviniſts*, or, as they are ſtiled in *Germany*, the Reformed, at the Head of whom were the Elector *Palatine*, and the Landgrave of *Heſſe-Caſſel*, who framed a new League, and intitled it the *Evangelical Union*. In the beginning of theſe Diſturbances the Emperor died; and the *Bohemians* rejecting his Nephew *Ferdinand* II. who ſuceeded him in the Empire, choſe *Frederick*. Elector *Palatine*, for their King, who married the Daughter of our *James* I. who ſpent a great deal of Money, though to very little Purpoſe, for the Service of his Son-in-Law; and is very unaccountably blamed, by moſt of our Hiſtorians, for not running headlong into a War, with which he had very little, if any thing to do. The Em-

peror's

peror's Succeſs was ſo great, and his Moderation ſo little, that it alarmed many of the Princes of the Empire, who had no Share in the Beginning of the Troubles, in Conſequence of which, the Princes and States of lower *Saxony*, thought fit to elect *Chriſtian* IV. King of *Denmark* their General; to whom our *Charles* I. ſent a large Sum of Money, for the Support of the Proteſtant Cauſe: He was ſoon beat by the Emperor's General Count *Tilly*; and this freſh Succeſs raiſed the Emperor's Spirits to ſuch a Degree, that he began to oppreſs the Proteſtants every where, and brought them into the loweſt Diſtreſs; which induced them in an Aſſembly at *Leipſick*, to call in the famous *Guſtavus Adolphus*, King of *Sweden*, to their Aſſiſtance; thus that great War, which coſt the *Germans* ſo dear, took riſe entirely ftom the overbearing and tyrannical Temper of the Emperors of the Houſe of *Auſtria*. This War continued during the Reign of *Ferdinand* III. and after the Death of the King of *Sweden*; 'till in the End, the Emperor was ſo much weakened, and his hereditary Countries exhauſted to ſo great a Degree, that he found himſelf under an abſolute Neceſſity of making Peace, which he did at *Munſter* in 1648.

By this Treaty, or rather by that of *Oſnaburgh*, which was a Kind of Preliminary to that of *Munſter*, the King of *Sweden* had the beſt Part of *Pomerania*, the Archbiſhoprick of *Bremen*, the Biſhoprick of *Verden* and other Places yielded to him; and the Archbiſhoprick of *Halberſtadt*, the Principality of *Minden*, the County of *Holſtein*, and the Archbiſhoprick of *Magdebourgh* were given up to the King of *Denmark*; the lower *Palatinate* was reſtored to the Elector of that Name; *Metz*, *Toul* and *Verdun* were yielded to the

the Crown of *France*, together with *Briſac*, *Suntgau*, Part of *Alſace*, and *Philipsburgh*; with this view, that an eaſy Entrance into the Empire might be ſecured to all theſe Princes; ſo jealous were the States of the Empire, at that Time, of the Power and Policy of the Houſe of *Auſtria*; and of ſuch Neceſſity did they eſteem it, to have the Means of calling in theſe puiſſant Protectors, in Caſe ſucceeding Emperors, and the Electors of *Bavaria*, who hitherto had always ſided with the Imperial Family againſt the Proteſtants and *France*, ſhould reſume their old Projects. This Treaty of *Munſter* was then looked upon as the Bulwark of the *Germanick* Conſtitution; and therefore amongſt the Medals of *Lewis* XIV. we find one very remarkable ſtruck upon this Occaſion. *France* is therein repreſented ſtanding before an Altar, upon which is depicted the Caduceus, interwoven with two Horns of Plenty; the Genius of *France* has in one Hand a Branch of Olive, in the other a Ballance, the Emperor's Crown lying in one Scale, and thoſe of the Princes of the Empire in the other, by which it is retained in Equilibrio; under the Feet of *France* lies a Yoke, which is ſuppoſed to have been taken from the Necks of the *German* States: The Legend of this Medal is *Libertas Germaniæ*, i. e. *The Liberty of Germany*; and in the Exergue, *Pax Monaſteriencis* 1648; the whole informing us, that thro' the Interpoſition of *France*, the Liberty of *Germany* was reſtored by the Peace of *Munſter* in 1648. Thus you ſee what was looked upon as the Ballance of Power in *Germany* at this Time, how its Conſtitution was fixed by the Aſſiſtance of foreign Powers, called in by the Princes and States of *Germany*, to preſerve them from being ſwallowed up by the Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria*.

You ſee that all this was done without the Intervention of *England*, or without our getting or loſing any thing thereby; though at the Beginning of the Quarrel, we had interpoſed in Favour of the *German* Princes, and in Conjunction with the Northern Kings. You ſee likewiſe how *France* acquired her firſt Footing in *Alſace*, and the Poſſeſſion of ſeveral Places, which Colonel *Mentzel* ſays are ſhortly to be taken from her; in fine, you will obſerve, that by this very Treaty, all the Conqueſts hitherto made by *France*, are given up, and yielded to her, in the ſtrongeſt Terms, by a Treaty, upon which the preſent Conſtitution of *Germany*, the Rights, Privileges and Poſſeſſions of all the Princes and States therein are abſolutely founded. A Treaty ratified and confirmed by many ſubſequent, I may ſay by all ſubſequent Treaties, and which if it ſhould be overturned, by reclaiming all that is given to *France* thereby, muſt neceſſarily induce new Diſturbances in *Germany*, perhaps more dangerous in their Conſequences, than any that have followed upon the Diſputes about the *Pragmatic Sanction*. Theſe I ſay are Things you diſcover at firſt Sight, from the bare Detail of what has formerly happened in this Country, and which cannot be denied by any who are competently verſed in Modern Hiſtory, and who are content to make uſe of their Knowledge, for the Support of Truth, rather than the Maintainance of their own Prejudices.

Thenceforward the Affairs of *Germany* acquired a new Face; the Electors and Princes conſidered the *French* King as their ſole Support, and the Emperor continued notwithſtanding to purſue his old Scheme of treating them as his Subjects; this occaſioned perpetual Diſputes and Quarrels in the Empire, and afforded the *French* King, I mean

Lewis

Lewis XIV. the moſt ambitious and withal the moſt able Monarch of his Time, to take ſuch Advantages of the Diſtractions of the Empire, as have given riſe to all the Doubts and Fears, that have terrified the Friends to the Ballance of Power in *Europe* ever ſince. *Lewis* knew how ſometimes to deceive the Emperor, and at others to cheat the ſeveral Princes of the Empire, into Treaties, viſibly injurious to the common Intereſts of *Germany*, by pretending to ſupport them from Time to Time, in their private Views, either by Money or Troops. Thus when he had formed his Scheme of over-running the *Dutch*, he thought fit firſt to tye up the Hands of the Emperor; and therefore having Intelligence of certain Troubles that had ariſen in *Hungary*, and of which being at ſuch a Diſtance, it would have been a Thing extremely difficult for him to have turned to any Account; he cauſed it to be inſinuated to the Emperor *Leopold*, that having nothing more in view than enjoying peaceably the Dominions yielded to him, by ſeveral Treaties, particularly that of *Aix la Chapelle*, by which he acquired *Burgundy*; and pretending to ſtand in fear that *Spain* and the States-General would endeavour to raviſh them from him, by a new War, into which they might have Hopes of drawing the Emperor, on Account of his near Relation in Blood to his Catholic Majeſty, and of his cloſe Connection with the States; he therefore teſtified an Inclination to conclude, purely for the Sake of preſerving Peace, a defenſive Alliance with his Imperial Majeſty, by which they might reciprocally engage not to aſſiſt each others Enemies. Into this Snare the Emperor fell, and ſuch an Alliance was actually concluded on the 1ſt of *November* 1671 at *Vienna*; by the laſt Article of which, the contracting

Parties promiſe to keep it abſolutely ſecret. The Emperor flattered himſelf, by Means of this Treaty, he had it entirely in his Power to act as he thought fit towards his diſcontented Subjects; and his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, on the other Hand, ſaw himſelf perfectly covered from any Apprehenſions on this ſide; and of Conſequence had all the Leiſure he could deſire for perfecting the Project he had formed, of humbling, or rather deſtroying the *Dutch*.

As for the Princes of the Empire, he had found means to ſecure many of them in his Intereſt: He flattered the Elector of *Bavaria* with the Hopes of a Marriage; the Elector *Palatine* ſtood indebted for his Dominions, and for his Dignity, to the Interpoſition of *France* in the Treaty of *Munſter*; the Eccleſiaſtical Electors, together with the Biſhop of *Munſter*, and ſome other Princes, were his by Inclination, and promiſed, that in Caſe of a Rupture, they would preſerve a ſtrict Neutrality, at leaſt, which was all he could deſire. The Elector of *Brandenburgh* alone penetrated the Views of *France*, and could not be drawn into any Engagements, and therefore when the *French* Scheme came to be executed he boldly and honeſtly ventured to aſſiſt the *Dutch*. Yet after all, when the Eyes of the whole World were open, when the Emperor, the King of *Spain*, and many of the *German* Princes ſaw the Neceſſity of entering at all Events into a War, which in its Conſequences muſt be fatal to themſelves, the Duke of *Hanover* thought to prefer his private Views to the publick Safety, and actually entered into a Treaty with *France*, dated the 10th of *December* 1672, by which he undertook to aſſiſt the *French* King againſt the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, in Caſe that Prince continued to ſuccour the *Dutch*. This plainly

plainly ſhews how impoſſible it is to ſecure the *German* Princes in the true Intereſt of *Germany*, and how little Reaſon there is to hope that they ſhould be drawn to act unanimouſly againſt *France*, let the Reaſons for their acting in ſuch a Manner, be ever ſo cogent or apparent. All the World knows what Iſſue that War had, and every Body who is acquainted with the Hiſtory of thoſe Times, muſt ſee that the Power and Inſolence of *France*, will always create ſuch Alliances upon the Continent, as will be ſufficient to reſtrain it. The Parliament of *England* forced *Charles* II. to abandon his Scheme of aſſiſting to deſtroy the *Dutch*; the Emperor and *Spain* came into the War, tho' with ſome Reluctance, and the *French* King, after conſuming much Blood and Treaſure, found himſelf under a Neceſſity of ſubmitting to a Peace, which was concluded at *Nimeguen*, in 1676; by which, though he reaped ſome Advantages, yet they were far ſhort of what he expected, and in Truth of what they had coſt them: So that if many Accidents had not concurr'd to divide and diſtract the Powers of *Europe*, he would ſcarce have been able, with all his Policy, to have reſtored his Affairs to ſuch a Degree, as to have been able to make the Figure he did in the next War.

After the Revolution, the Conduct of the *French* King united againſt him almoſt all the Princes on the Continent, as well as the Maritime Powers, inſomuch that it will be the Wonder of Poſterity, how the Kingdom of *France* was able to reſiſt ſo many Enemies at once. To underſtand this, we need only to conſider the Advantages which *Lewis* XIV. obtained by the Miſtakes and Miſintelligence of the Allies. The Emperor remained ſtill in his old Diſpoſition, and made ſo many Efforts towards eſtabliſhing an illegal Power over the

Princes

Princes and the States of *Germany*, that notwithſtanding he was able to awe the Empire into acting againſt *France*, yet many of its Princes had a ſecret Correſpondence with that Crown, from an Apprehenſion, that if *France* was reduced as low as the Confederates ſeemed deſirous of ſeeing her reduced, it muſt then be a Prey to the Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria*. On the other Hand, *England* and *Holland* bore much too large a Share in the Expence of that War, which involved them in Debts and Difficulties, with which they had much ado to ſtruggle, and at the ſame Time, the Coldneſs and Inactivity of the Princes of the Empire, and the Pride and Poverty of the Emperor, who ready to promiſe, and ever failing in performing his Promiſes, deprived them of the Advantages they might otherwiſe have gained, and left *France* an Appearance of Superiority, though in Truth, ſhe was much inferior in Force to the Allies. So that at laſt all Parties being weary, a Treaty of Peace was concluded at *Ryſwick*, which rather pacified than compoſed the Troubles of *Europe*, and left both Parties at Liberty to form ſuch Negotiations, as might enable them, in Caſe of a new War, to atchieve what they had reſpectively intended when they entered into this.

The Reader will eaſily diſcern that the Weakneſs of the Empire, in this and in the ſucceeding War, was not owing to want of Force, but to a want of Reſolution, and of a Deſire of actually performing what they ſeemed to intend. The Truth of the matter was, that in Virtue of his hereditary Dominions, and the Influence of his Authority, the Emperor was in a Manner Maſter of the Imperial Diet, and engaged the Empire to enter into Wars with *France*, as often as he found it convenient for his Intereſt: But as many of the Princes

ces acted in the firſt War with great Reluctance, and with little Fidelity, ſo in the laſt War the Electors of *Bavaria* and *Cologn*, declared abſolutely for *France* and *Spain* againſt the Emperor, and this as the Reader may ſee by conſulting *Lamberti*'s Collections, not without very plauſible Reaſons, for acting as they did. Yet after all this, one needs only to caſt one's Eye over the following Scheme of the Force of the Empire, ſettled and eſtabliſhed by its Conſtitution, in order to be convinced, that if the States of which it is compoſed, would act firmly and with unanimity, they muſt be at all times able not only to check *France*, but even to force that haughty Crown, to accept of ſuch Terms as they ſhould think requiſite for their Safety. This Scheme of the *German* Power was founded on the Proportions they were obliged to furniſh in Caſe of a War, and the Number of Men they have raiſed upon particular Occaſions.

The Eccleſiaſtical Princes are able to raiſe

	Men
Mentz	6,000
Treves	6,000
Cologne	6,000
Saltsburgh	8,000
The Biſhop of *Munſter*	8,000
Leige	8,000
Wurtsburgh	2,000
Bamburgh	5,000
Paderborn	3,000
Osnaburgh	2,500
The Abbot of *Fulda*	6,000
The other Biſhops of the Empire together	6,000
Carried over	66,500

	Men
Brought over	66,500
The Abbies and Provoſtſhips of the Empire	8,000
Total of the Eccleſiaſtical Princes	74,500

The Secular Princes are able to raiſe,

The Emperor for	*Hungary*	30,000
	Bohemia, *Sileſia*, and *Moravia*	30,000
	Auſtria and his other Dominions	30,000
The King of *Pruſſia*		40,000
The Elector of *Saxony*		25,000
The Elector *Palatine*		15,000
The Duke of *Wirtembergh*		15,000
The Landgrave of *Heſſe-Caſſel*		15,000
The Prince of *Baden*		10,000
The Prince of *Brunſwick Lunenburgh*, or Elector of *Hanover*		30,000
The Duke of *Holſtein*		12,000
The Duke of *Mecklenburg*		15,000
The Princes of *Anhalt*		6,000
The Prince of *Lawenburg*		6,000
The Elector of *Bavaria*		30,000
The Dukes of *Saxony*		10,000
The Princes of *Naſſau*		10,000
The other Princes and Imperial Towns of the Empire		50,000
Total of the Secular Princes		379,000
Total of the Eccleſ. Princes		74,500
Total of Forces of the Empire		453,500

There

There is one Thing more that I muſt touch upon before I quit this Part of my Subject, and that is the Figure the Princes of the Empire ſtood in formerly with Reſpect to *England*. In the Reign of *Henry* VIII. the Emperor himſelf took *Engliſh* pay, and fought under the Banner of that Monarch; it is not likely therefore that in thoſe Days, the Princes of the Empire were thought much ſuperior in Rank to our Nobility. The Caſe is indeed ſomewhat altered ſince, for the *German* Princes are grown greater and more independant, and the Power of the *Engliſh* Nobility is as much declined ſince that Time. Under the Reign of Queen *Elizabeth*, we had more frequent Intercourſe with the *German* Princes; but even then they were not conſidered in any extraordinary light here, as appears by ſome Grants of Penſions, very far ſhort of modern Subſidies; ſcarce ſo many Shillings as we now give them Pounds, which the Reader may find in *Rymer*'s Collections. King *James* I. married his eldeſt Daughter to the Elector *Palatine*, then called the *Palſgrave*, which was not thought a very advantageous Match in thoſe Days, as appears by her Mother's calling her Goody *Palſgrave*; and yet this Marriage obliged us to interfere more than we had done before with the Affairs of *Germany*, and in a Manner very little to our Advantage. In the Time of *Charles* I. the Elector *Palatine* took Refuge here with his two Brothers *Rupert* and *Maurice*. As for the Elector he remained with the Parliament, who paid him, for a time, a great deal of Reſpect; the two younger Brothers ſerved in his Majeſty's Army, where, though they were Princes of the Blood, and both very accompliſh'd Soldiers, the Haughtineſs of their Tempers, and the Roughneſs of their Manners, did his Majeſty

irreparable Miſchief. *Charles* II. in the Time of his Exile took Shelter at *Cologn*, was kindly received by the Duke of *Neubourgh*, and treated with great Reſpect by the Imperial Diet, of which he retained a grateful Remembrance as long as he lived, and during the Courſe of his Reign held a friendly Correſpondence with the Emperor and moſt of the Princes; as appears from Sir *William Temple*'s Memoirs, and more particularly from the Life of Sir *Leoline Jenkins*. A Treaty of Marriage was once ſet on Foot between the Duke of *York*, and an Archdutcheſs of *Inſpruch*; and when the King was at War with the *Dutch*, he gave large Subſidies to the Biſhop of *Munſter*, who in return invaded the Territories of the States, and gave them a great deal of Trouble. The cloſe Correſpondence between King *James* II. and the Court of *France*, hindered his having much to do either with the Emperor or Empire, which proved of great Diſadvantage to him, and in the End was one of the principal Cauſes of the Succeſs of the Revolution. After which we came to have a cloſe Conjunction with the Emperor, and a very friendly Intercourſe with ſeveral Princes of the Empire, to whom we paid large Subſidies, for the Troops they thought fit to lend for the Service of, what was called, the common Cauſe; and in which, excluſive of the Sums they got by the War, they ſeem'd to have at leaſt as much Intereſt as we. So that while the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* were fighting the Battles of the Empire, as well as their own, they paid the *German* Princes for their Aſſiſtance; and thoſe Princes received vaſt Sums annually, for doing what, according to the then Syſtem of Things, they ſhould have done out of a pure Regard to their own Intereſt, ſince they all of them had Pretenſions upon *France*, and expected Satisfaction,

faction, reſpectively, as to their Demands, whenever a general Peace came to be made; and thus by a Felicity peculiar to *German* Politicks, their leſs powerful Neighbours not only fought on their Side, but paid them likewiſe for fighting for themſelves.

We are now come to the Second Part of our Task, in which we are to examine the preſent State of *Germany*, with Reſpect to its own Power, and the Relation it has to the reſt of *Europe*. It will, previous to this, be neceſſary to obſerve, that by the preſent State of *Germany*, I mean the Condition that great Country is in, ſince the Imperial Title has been transferred from the Houſe of *Auſtria* to that of *Bavaria*. This I muſt take leave to ſay is, in my humble Opinion, a Circumſtance agreeable to moſt, and not unpleaſant to any of the Princes of the Empire. They felt ſufficiently the Weight which his hereditary Dominions gave to every Emperor of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and were uneaſy enough under it, becauſe they ſaw that it was conſtantly directed to the ſecuring his own Dominions, and aggrandizing his own Family; with which the States of the Empire thought they had no immediate Concern. This Diſpoſition was extremely remarkable in the three laſt Monarchs of that Houſe, *Leopold*, *Joſeph* and *Charles*: The former was an ambitious, crafty and obſtinate Prince, infinitely more deſirous of making himſelf abſolute at home, than formidable abroad; his Maxims of Government rendered him the weakeſt Prince in *Europe*, notwithſtanding the Extent of his Dominions; his love of arbitrary Power, kept the *Hungarians*, who have ſo nobly defended his Grand-Daughter, almoſt always Rebels, and his Bigotry made the People of *Bohemia* Slaves. His Uſage of the Houſe of *Bavaria*

drove them to a close Conjunction with *France*, and his Pride, Parsimony, and positive Adherence to his own Notions lost him the Succession of *Spain*. The Emperor *Joseph* was in some Measure the Reverse of his Father, for though he had as much Haughtiness, yet instead of being indolent he was fierce and arrogant, full of the Grandeur of his House, and very little inclined to find out the Distinction between Slaves and Subjects. He was always expecting mighty Succours from his Allies, and always deficient in what he promised for the Support of the common Cause. His Behaviour towards the Princes of the Empire, made them backward in every thing; and as our glorious General, the Duke of *Marlborough*, told some of their Ministers, at a Conference, their Negligence inspired *France* with Hopes, which alone prevented her accepting the Terms offered by the Allies; and indeed it was on this side only, that throughout the whole War the *French* had any Advantage, except in *Spain*, where the *German* Politicks defeated all the Maritime Powers could do in Support of the *German* Interest. *Charles* VI. was raised to the Empire by the Endeavours of the Allies, and he discovered even before his Election the Genius of his Family, by declaring he would not accept the Imperial Crown, on the Terms it had been worn by his Brother and Father, and the Capitulation was accordingly altered to suit it to his Humour. His severe Government of the *Italians*, drew them to plot against him, and to intrigue with *France* and *Spain*; as his Ill-usage of the House of *Savoy* opened a Passage to those Armies, which deprived him of *Naples* and *Sicily*, and very narrowly missed of driving him entirely out of *Italy*. His Behaviour to this Nation was not the most grateful;

and

and his Conduct in reſpect to the *Dutch*, was far from anſwering the Obligations he was under to that Republick. His obſtinate Refuſal of all Terms of Accomodation with *Spain*, for a long Time kept the Ballance of Power fluctuating, as his ſudden and unnatural Conjunction loſt it, by the Turn that Alliance gave to the Politicks of the Maritime Powers. His War with the *Turks* was ill-contrived, and worſe executed; and his Dependance upon *France* to the laſt, from an Apprehenſion that Zeal for Religion would bind her to his Intereſt, was an Error for which his Family has ſmarted ſeverely ſince. Taking therefore all this together, I make no Scruple of ſaying, that the Power of the *Germanic* Body is increaſed by this Change; and that there is more Reaſon to expect the Princes and States of the Empire ſhould vigorouſly exert their Force, now they are free, then there was to hope it, while they were under the Influence of an Emperor who conſidered them abſolutely as his Subjects, and yet confined his Cares to the Inhabitants of his hereditary Dominions, or rather of the upper and lower *Auſtria*.

This I know will be conſidered by many as a Political Paradox, and by ſome as a dangerous Maxim, the Belief of which ought by all means to be diſcouraged. But this moves not me; I write from no other Motive than from the Love of Truth and my Country, for which Reaſon, I think myſelf as little bound to conceal whatever I have Reaſon to think may be divulged to her Benefit, as to publiſh what may gratify the Prejudices of particular Perſons, and yet prove little to her Advantage. It is a Jeſt for any Man to pique himſelf upon being an Enemy to *France*, or a Friend to *Germany*; the ſole Characteriſtick here of a Patriot, is his Love to *Britain*; for whoever

ſacrifices his native Country to Fondneſs, or Fury to an ill-judged Partiality, or an ill-timed Reſentment, is certainly a weak if not a wicked Man, let his Quality be what it will, or his Reputation, even for the Knowledge of foreign Affairs, ever ſo well eſtabliſhed. The great Point now is thoroughly to underſtand the Queſtion before us, that is to ſay, what is the true Strength of the *Germanick* Body, how far they need, and to what degree it is in our Power to aſſiſt them. This I ſay is the Queſtion, at preſent, moſt material to *Britain*, for if it be not thoroughly and timely underſtood, we may run the Hazard of exhauſting ourſelves, to ſuch a Degree, as we may never be able to recover. In reſpect to this very Circumſtance, how fatal may any Miſtake be about it? If the State of *Germany* is bettered by this Change in the Empire, and our Welfare depends ſo much, as it is generally thought to do, on the Security of the *Germanic* Body, we ſhould be actually fighting againſt ourſelves, if we ſhould uſe our warmeſt Endeavours to overturn our new Syſtem, and reſtore the old one? But perhaps ſome Proofs will be expected of the Truth of what I ſay, and theſe I ſhall lay down in very few Words. Firſt then, it appears that ſuch an Emperor freely elected is moſt agreeable to the *German* Conſtitution; and it is a general Rule in Policy, that the Force of a Nation is then greateſt, when the Spirit of its Govern-s ment is in its utmoſt Vigour. Secondly, it i- moſt likely that the Princes and States of *Germa ny*, will exert themſelves moſt under an Emperor from whom they have much to hope, and nothing to fear; which will be always the Caſe, ſo long as they are not governed by a Prince, whoſe hereditary Dominions give him more Power, than even their conjunctive Force would be able to deal with.

with. Thirdly, the Authority which ſuch an Emperor may acquire by a wiſe and upright Adminiſtration, will actually raiſe a new Power in *Germany*; the Houſe of *Auſtria* ſtill retaining its former Strength, together with the Means of exerting it more freely. Theſe Reaſons appear to me extremly cogent, and I can yet add another, which muſt prove concluſive, and it is this, that his Majeſty, as Elector of *Hanover*, gave his Vote for his preſent Imperial Majeſty, which he would never have done, if he had not conceived his Election agreeable to the Intereſt of the *Germanick* Body; he who thinks otherwiſe, and would aſcribe his Vote to the Terror of *French* Arms, and the Danger of the Electorate, is unacquainted with the Firmneſs of his Majeſty's Temper, and muſt be at once an Enemy to the Royal Family, and no great Friend to his Country.

After clearing this Point, which I think I have effectually done, I ſhall proceed to another, which is the prodigious Growth of Power amongſt the *German* Princes. The King of *Pruſſia*, is at leaſt ten Times more conſiderable a Potentate, than the antient Elector of *Brandenburgh*; as the Reader will eaſily diſcern, if he conſults that manual of modern Politicks, M. *Van Hoey*'s Letters. There he will ſee that the *French* Court conſider his Power as a Ballance to their own, and repreſent it as ſuch to the States, which they would never have done, if they had not thought it plauſible at leaſt, if not clear to a degree of Self-Evidence; his late Conduct with Reſpect to *France*, ought not at all to leſſen our Opinion of his Power, ſince it is not reaſonable to believe, that a Prince who has ſuch extenſive Territories, and withal ſuch boundleſs Ambition, ſhould ever think of becoming dependant on any other Power, or even of entering into ſuch

Meaſures,

Meaſures, as might encreaſe its Influence in *Germany*, to ſuch a Degree as might endanger his own Safety; this I ſay is a thing not only improbable, but altogether impoſſible; and therefore we ought to conſider this Prince as one of the greateſt Powers in *Germany*, and a Power too that will be continually growing. I ſhall readily admit that this may be in ſome Reſpects a diſagreeable Proſpect, but in the Light, in which we are now to conſider it, it is apparently otherwiſe. *France* might much more eaſily ſwallow up Five, or Six little Principalities, than ſhe could conquer ſo great a Force, as this Monarch can and has brought into the Field; which Conſideration may with like Juſtice be applied to other Princes, that we ſhall mention; and therefore their Grandeur muſt be regarded as a true Barrier againſt the Power of *France*, unleſs we imagine they can be wheedled into Slavery, and if ſo, I doubt the Maritime Powers cannot force them to be free.

The King of *Poland*, as Elector of *Saxony*, is alſo much more potent than his Predeceſſors, and as he lives in a very good Correſpondence with all the Princes of his Family, he is able to do much, whenever he is forced to exert his utmoſt Strength. I am ſenſible, it is a common Opinion, that his Kingdom is of little uſe to his Electorate; but I know too, that ſuch as ſay this, are not very well acquainted with the Maxims of *German* Princes, who have always a warm, and laudable Affection for their Hereditary Dominions. Beſides, the Revenues of *Poland* are very conſiderable, little ſhort, if I am rightly informed, of our civil Liſt; and as the King does not reſide much at *Warſaw*, and has always abundance of *Poliſh* Noblemen about his Court, there muſt be a great deal ſaved, and the Electorate muſt be long ago indemnified

for

for the neceſſary Expences of the Election. Add to this, that his *Poliſh* Majeſty might eaſily employ the whole Forces of that Kingdom in *Germany*, if he ſhould either engage in a Quarrel, agreeable to the Senſe of his *Poliſh* Subjects, or ſhould be attacked, without any juſt Ground, in his own Dominions. We know what a Figure the late King *Auguſtus* made, and we can therefore eaſily Conjecture, what may be in the power of any other enterpriſing Prince of the *Saxon* Line: We ought alſo to take into the Account, the Relation between this Family and the Houſe of *Auſtria*, to which, according to the Pragmatic Sanction, he is next Heir, and at no ſuch Diſtance, as to render it impoſſible, that the preſent Generation ſhould ſee the Dominions of both Houſes in one Hand; and then he would be very near a Match for *France*, without any Aſſiſtance.

The Elector of *Hanover*, is certainly a very rich and powerful Prince; much more ſo than his Anceſtors. Our late King by Marriage, and by Purchaſe, doubled the Strength, as well as the Extent of his Dominions; and if the Peace of *Germany* was once ſettled, I do not doubt but further Acquiſitions might be made. Beſides, the Princes of his Family, who are now in a Manner dependant on the Electorate, are very powerful; and the Alliances the preſent King has made in *Germany*, are ſuch as already ſtrengthen him much, and muſt in Time do it more. So that to imagine *France* could at any time awe his *German* Territories, is a Notion very ill founded, they might do it once indeed, by a Concurrence of odd Accidents, but I believe Nobody that conſiders how dear the *French* have paid for this laſt Enterprize of theirs, will believe that they will ſuddenly truſt a great Army in the Heart of *Germany* again;

eſpecially if right Meaſures be taken to cement firmly thoſe Powers, that ought to have a natural Affection for each other, and who have certainly the ſame Intereſt, whatever different Views they may ſometimes, through Paſſion, Pique, or an ill regulated Ambition, be tempted to purſue. Theſe Sort of Deluſions are but momentary, and if their Neighbours were not too much alarmed by them, the Laws of the Empire, the Interpoſition of other *German* Princes, and the Repreſentations of their own Subjects, would ſoon bring them back to a right Senſe of Things. But if upon every little diſorder in the lower *Saxony*, it is conceived that the whole Syſtem of *Europe* is ſhaken, and therefore new Alliances muſt be formed, there will be no End of ſuch Commotions; becauſe it will be viſibly the Intereſt of ſeveral Princes to promote ſuch Diſturbances, purely for the Sake of obtaining Subſidies, and letting out their Troops at a very high Rate, which draws immenſe Sums of Money into Countries, where heretofore very little of it was to be ſeen, and which is perhaps of ſtill greater Conſequence to thoſe who pay it, furniſhes the Means of ſetting up and carrying on Manufactures, that otherwiſe would never have been thought of; whereby thoſe who are the Dupes of this Sort of *German* Politicks, at once exhauſt themſelves, and cut off the Means, by which Part of their Money might be brought back again.

It will I dare ſay appear a greater Paradox than any I have yet advanced, when I inſiſt on the Emperor's being a very powerful Prince, as Elector of *Bavaria*, but whoever conſiders that his Electorate, and the upper *Palatinate*, ſubſiſted ſo long his own, two *French*, and two *Auſtrian*, Armies, and remembers at the ſame Time, that there is

a wide Difference between a ruined Country, and a loſt one, will believe alſo that I have Reaſon on my Side. I know very well, that it may be replied that it is not only ruined but a loſt Country to him at preſent; but I dare propheſy that it will not be long ſo, and I hope when this Prophecy is fulfilled, that People will be content to believe, that *German* Princes are the beſt Judges of their own Intereſts, and will ſooner or later convince the reſt of *Europe*, that they are ſo. His Father likewiſe loſt this Country, but he recovered it, not ſo much by the Interpoſition of *France*, as by the viſible Concern expreſſed for him, by that very Diet, which put him under the Bann of the Empire: We ſee at preſent how great Reſpect is paid him, ſtript as he is of his Dominions, at *Frankfort*, and I doubt we ſhall ſoon ſee that his Diſtreſs will raiſe him more potent Friends, than ever were his *French* Auxiliaries. But to return to our Subject; the Electorate of *Bavaria*, and the upper *Palatinate* are rich and fruitful Countries, ſo that if ever the Empetor is peaceably eſtabliſhed at *Munich*, and is able to form his Court there, he will ſoon repair the Damages his Country has ſuſtained by this deſtructive War, and this is a new Advantage that ariſes from transferring the Imperial Crown from one Family to another, and muſt appear ſo to ſuch as are proper Judges of the Power and Influence of an Emperor, in providing nobly for all the younger Branches of his Family. I ſhall not ſay much of the Elector *Palatine*, or of the Eccleſiaſtical Electors; but this I think is ſelf evident, that whatever Inconveniences their Subjects may have ſuffered by the Paſſage of ſo many Armies through their Countries, yet the prodigious Sums of Money, ſpent amongſt them by the *Engliſh* and *French*, muſt have greatly increaſed their Wealth,

and ſupplied them with ſuch Means for carrying on their Manufactures and Commerce as they could never otherwiſe have acquired. I do not ſay that particular People have found their Advantage in this, but the whole muſt have done it; for if ready Money is brought into a Country, and left there, that Country muſt be richer, than it was before.

The Landgrave of *Heſſe*, who is at preſent King of *Sweden*, is much too conſiderable a Prince, to be paſſed over in the Account of *German* Potentates, without particular Notice; his Family have been always diſtinguiſhed in the Diſputes of *Germany*, by the Wiſdom of their own Conduct, and by the gallant Behaviour of their Subjects. It is true that his Dominions are not large, or the Country remarkable for its Fertility; it is likewiſe true, that it is ſplit into ſeveral Principalities, and ſeated in the Part of *Germany* leaſt favourable to Trade; and yet under all theſe Difficulties the Landgrave of *Heſſe* is, after the Electors, the moſt conſiderable Prince in *Germany*, and the preſent Emperor has thought fit to raiſe him to a Level with the Electors, in every thing except Title; and this, notwithſtanding we have 6,000 of his Troops in our pay, who were once within three Day's March of a Battle, with the Emperor's Auxiliares, and made afterwards as good a Figure, as any of the *German* Troops in our pay. I do not believe that *Heſſe* has loſt any thing by the Landgrave's being raiſed to the Dignity of King of *Sweden*, but though I have the higheſt Eſteem for the great and amiable Qualities of his preſent *Swediſh* Majeſty, yet I ſhould not care to have it put upon me to prove, that *Sweden* has reaped any mighty Advantage, from his Adminiſtration; though I believe him to be as brave a Man, and

as good a King, as ever ſat upon that Throne I know however that there have been Malecontents in that Country, who have inſinuated that an overweaning Fondneſs for his Family, and an earneſt Deſire to have the Crown of *Sweden* paſs through the collateral Branch, as well as the Dominions of *Heſſe*, and ſome Negotiations entered into, for this Purpoſe, with a certain Crown, as famous for family Attachments, gave riſe, or at leaſt gave Strength to that Party, which has ſince changed the whole Syſtem of Affairs in the *North*, and given his *Swediſh* Majeſty the Succeſſor in the World, which we may ſafely ſay, he was leaſt inclined to. But however he may have managed Affairs in the North, where he conſidered himſelf as a Kind of Political Father-in-Law, he has been moſt certainly a very tender Parent to his Subjects in *Germany*, and though it may be objected that he has expoſed their Perſons for the Sake of Gain, by letting out his Troops to ſeveral Princes for many Years together, yet I think I may affirm, that except in the late unlucky Battle of *Braunau*, they were as ſafe in the Exerciſe of their Military Function, as if they had remained in their Blackſmiths Forges, and were only better paid; ſo that now Silver is as Plenty in *Heſſe*, as in any Country in the Empire; tho' heretofore, I have been credibly informed, they made uſe of Leather, ſtampt with the Landgrave's Arms, to ſupply the Place of Money.

To theſe I might add the Duke of *Wirtemberg*, a very great and potent Prince; the Counts of *Naſſau*, the Princes of *Baden*, and many others; but that I avoid Prolixity, and mention no more than what I am obliged to by my Subject. Laſt of all I ſhall ſhut up what I have here to ſay, as to the preſent Power of *Germany*, with obſerving

that

that the Queen of *Hungary* has now near 200,000 regular Troops in her Service, and if we may believe what the *Vienna* Gazette has lately told us, concerning the Declaration of Count *Palfi*, Palatine of *Hungary*, that beſides recruiting the Troops of that Nation, they could ſupply her with 86,000 more, without exhauſting their Force, to a degree of endangering the Safety of that Kingdom; we may ſay of the *French*, with Reſpect to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, what the late King of *Poland* ſaid of *Charles* XII. wintering in *Saxony*, *that he never knew 'till then the Worth of his Subjects*. We muſt likewiſe remember, that ſince this War began, the *Bohemians* have been ſpared, that is to ſay, the Queen of *Hungary* has not received from them any Supplies of Men or Money, proportionable to what ſhe would have done, in Caſe that Kingdom had not became the Seat of War. Upon the whole therefore I think it fully and clearly appears, that the Force of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, is not at all leſſened by transferring the Imperial Dignity to another Family, and which it is not impoſſible, may in Time be of great Uſe to the Houſe of *Auſtria* itſelf. As it is, we have ſeen the Queen of *Hungary* do much more than any Emperor of her Family has ever done, though it is clear that they might have done it, as well as ſhe, and no doubt would have done it, if they had not found other Powers inclined to do things for them, ſome upon one Principle, ſome on another, for every kind of Enthuſiaſm has been favourable to the Houſe of *Auſtria*. The Cauſe of Chriſtendom brought *John Sobieski*, King of *Poland*, to the Relief of *Vienna*, when it was beſieged by the *Turks* in 1683: And the Care of the common Cauſe brought the Duke of *Marlborough* with the Army of the Allies to *Blenheim* in 1704,

when

when the Houſe of *Auſtria* was again on the Point of being cruſhed by its own Weight, but never 'till now was it ſaved by its own Force; which ſhews how great an Injury we do to this moſt illuſtrious Family, when we are too haſty, or too bountiful in our Succours. It is for the Intereſt of *Europe* that the Houſe of *Auſtria* ſhould be ſupported, that I admit, but would it hurt the Intereſt of *Europe*, would it in the leaſt Prejudice the common Cauſe, if the Houſe of *Auſtria* was in a Condition to ſupport itſelf? But it may be ſaid, that if you truſt to this, it might be overwhelmed on a ſudden, and then all Aſſiſtance will come too late. Overwhelming of a ſudden, a Power able to raiſe 200,000 regular Troops, and having always two thirds of that Number in pay, is a Paradox with a Vengeance. Beſides the Houſe of *Auſtria* have been heretofore extremely apt to miſtake their own Strength, of which I will give the Reader a moſt extraordinary Inſtance. The Kingdom of *Hungary* had been always elective, yet in the Year 1683, the Emperor *Leopold* demanded in a Diet at *Preſbourgh*, that it ſhould be made Hereditary, for this moſt ſingular Reaſon; that he had ſpent more Money in defending that Kingdom from the *Turks*, than it was worth, and therefore he conceived he had as good a Title to it, as to the reſt of his hereditary Dominions. This Emperor little thought that in half a Century, the Inhabitants of this worthleſs Kingdom of *Hungary*, would not only ſecure but recover his hereditary Countries, from the ſtrongeſt and beſt conducted Confederacy, that ever was formed againſt his Houſe.

By this Time I hope I have fully made good what I promiſed, as to the ſecond Point, and have ſhewn that with Reſpect to the Power of *France*,

and

and the Ballance of *Europe*, the latter is not in Danger from any real Weakneſs of the *Germanic* Body, in proportion to the former, but from the Want of Unanimity, Public Spirit, and generous Concern for their Country, in the ſeveral Princes and States that compoſe that moſt auguſt Aſſembly, the Diet of *Francfort*. If therefore we are truly inclined to aſſiſt the *Germans*, in the moſt uſeful Way to them, and the leaſt burthenſome to ourſelves, we ought to ſend over to them ſome of our great Patriot Speakers, who overturned the laſt Adminiſtration by their Eloquence, and who it is thought will very ſoon have little elſe to do, as Miſſionaries to propagate right Principles, to inſpire them with Conſtancy, Steadineſs, and above all Frugality in public Affairs, which would ſoon ſet them above the Want of Foreign Succours, and enable them, if they thought it neceſſary, to take from *France*, all that in many Ages ſhe has ever purloined from the Empire, even in half a Campaign. That this is no Chimerical Project, or Repetition of the E——— of *S*———*r*'s crude Notions, of marching at once to *Paris*, ſo highly ridiculed by thoſe who yet would encourage us to maintain a War for the Behalf of the Empire, without its Conſent, may appear from the following Scheme of the preſent Strength of *Germany*, which never will (by any competent judge) be conteſted, compared with the utmoſt Force of *France*, that, as the Infallible Author of *Faction Detected* informs us, *Page* 122. of the *Second Edition*, cannot bring Three Hundred Twenty Thouſand Men into the Field, though her very Being were at Stake.

The

	Men.
The Queen of *Hungary* and *Bohemia*, or in other Words, the Houſe of *Auſtria* in its preſent Situation	200000
The King of *Pruſſia*, according to the exacteſt Liſt of the Forces now in his Service, which if it was neceſſary he might poſſibly augment to double the Number	150000
The King of *Poland*, as Elector of *Saxony*, according to the Number of Men in his Service, in the Month of *June*, 1741	75000
His Imperial Majeſty, as Elector of *Bavaria*, who in the preſent War has had on Foot at once	45000
His *Britannic* Majeſty, as Elector of *Hanover*	30000
The Elector *Palatine*	30000
The Landgrave of *Heſſe Caſſel*	24000
The Reſt of the Princes of *Germany*, according to their preſent Eſtabliſhments, taking in the Troops of the Circles	240000
	794000

This is ſo fair and moderate a Calculation, that it cannot with any Reaſon be queſtioned; but if any one will ſuggeſt that the Intrigues of *France* may engage the Northern Crowns, or the Empreſs of *Ruſſia* to create a Diverſion, which however would be very improbable, if the States of the Empire were united, the Kings of *Poland* and *Pruſſia* might be left to deal with them, and even then the *Germanic* Body might without any Diffi-

culty bring down 350,000 Men upon *France*, which, with the Aſſiſtance of the Fleets of the Maritime Powers, would be much more than ſufficient to reduce the Houſe of *Bourbon*, powerful as ſhe is, to Reaſon; or if that could not be done, to ſuch a Situation, as might render her unreaſonableneſs uneaſy only to ſuch as have the Misfortune to be her Subjects, eſpecially after ſhe has exhauſted the Treaſures and Inhabitants of her Dominions to ſuch a Degree, as it is notorious ſhe has done, within theſe ſeven Years paſt.

The Notions that we have entertained of the Diſtreſſes of the *Germans*, and of their Inability to reſiſt *France*, have been owing partly to their own Repreſentations, which to be ſure were ſuch as ſuited beſt their own Intereſts, and partly from the Views of great People at Home, who found their private Advantage in ſupporting theſe Miſrepreſentations. It is not however to be denied, that *France*, has had all along conſiderable Advantages in her Diſputes with the Emperor and Empire; but this, as we have before ſhewn, was owing to the Dread that moſt of the Members of the Empire had of the Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, which rendered them afraid of its Succeſs, and well pleaſed whenever it was humbled, though partly at their own Expence. If any one ſhould demand, why ſince the Force of *Germany* is ſo great, and the Uſurpations of *France* ſo many, the Princes and States of the Empire do not unite to do themſelves Juſtice, and reſtore to their Country, what has been pared from it by that perfidious Power. I muſt ſay this Queſtion, which imports us more than we are aware of, is not very hard to anſwer, and the Reader will find himſelf in a condition to do it effectually, if he conſiders the following

following Remarks, which he will find not only founded on Reaſon, but verified by Experience.

It is firſt of all to be conſidered, that the great Powers in *Germany* have more Reſpect to their own particular Views, for the aggrandizing of their Families, by enlarging their Dominions than to the common Good of *Germany*, which has always given the *French* an Opportunity either of detaching them from the common Cauſe, as they did the Electors of *Bavaria* or *Cologn* in the Beginning of the laſt War; or of prevailing upon them, to do them private Services, which was the Caſe in King *William*'s War; when ſeveral of the Princes, whoſe Names it would not be altogether ſo convenient to mention at preſent, betrayed the Councils of the Allies, and in ſome Caſes went further to earn their Penſions they privately received from that Court. This ſhews that the Loſſes they ſuſtained in that War, was not ſo much owing to the Power of *France*, as to their own Jealouſies and Avarice, and is a Demonſtration of the Weakneſs of the *French*, who have always truſted more to their Intrigues and to their Money, than to the Force of their Arms. In the next Place, let us obſerve that the Electors and other Princes, whoſe Dominions are on the Frontiers of the *French* Territories, were extremely awed by a Power ſo much ſuperior to their own. Since in all Wars between the Empire and *France*, the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and the greater Princes, were Gainers, while theſe States and their Subjects were conſtant Sacrifices, the *French* taking a Pleaſure often in revenging upon them, the Diſappointments they met with elſewhere; as for example, in the War in 1672, the *French* committed ſuch horrid Cruelties in the *Palatinate*, that the Elector *Palatine* ſent a Challenge to M. *Turrenne*,

which that General refuſed to accept, without the Leave of the King his Maſter. Now though this Dread of the *French* is certainly an Inducement to ſuch Princes to act, as if they were in the Intereſt of *France*, yet we can never ſuppoſe that it really inclines them to that Intereſt; nor can we doubt, if they had a proper Opportunity, they would forbear returning the *French* the many Compliments of Fire and Sword which they are at preſent in their Debt. But then we ought, thirdly, to remark, that both the greater and leſſer Princes of *Germany* have actually found, or thought they have found their Account, in nurſing, as it were, Wars in their own Country, by letting out their Troops for Hire, receiving Subſidies, and catching now one Piece of a Country, and then another, as Occaſion offered. Let us but conſider the immenſe Sums that were paid by *England* and *Holland* for Auxiliaries in the laſt War, which did not fall ſhort of 20000000 Guilders annually; let us remember what large Remittances have been made from Time to Time ever ſince, for the Hire of Troops, that Princes were to hold in Readineſs, though they were never called upon, ſo much as to march; and let us not forget what it has coſt *France* within theſe Five, and ourſelves, and the *Dutch* too within theſe Three Years, to furniſh Fuel for the Wars in *Germany*, and we ſhall eaſily perceive that conſiderable Profit may be made even of this Trade of Confuſion; for I think that even the Author of *Faction detected* allows, that of all the Money ſent into *Germany*, not a Penny of it finds its Way back again, as it does out of other Countries, but when the War is over, which drains them of their ſuperfluous People, that were bred up only to the Trade of Blood, their Princes ſit down in Peace, and enjoy the Riches that have been

been acquired in this manner from other Nations. A fourth Remark is this, that even the Practice beforementioned, how little agreeable ſoever it may be to their true Intereſt, conſidered in a political Light, yet has by Accident proved a great Addition to their Strength, by increaſing the Forces of *Germany*, and rendering the Care and Diſcipline of their Troops the principal Study of many, I might ſay moſt of their Princes; ſo that it is now a quite different Thing from what it was, with Reſpect to a *German* Army. Whenever a Confederacy is formed, and the Armies are to take the Field, new haſty Levies are by no means neceſſary; they have regular Forces enough to form whatever Armies they pleaſe, and theſe in a Condition to march at an Hour's warning, with proper Trains of Artillery, and whatever elſe is requiſite for a modern Campaign. Their Officers are numerous, and withal Men of Courage and Experience; ſo that 50000 *Germans* are an equal Match for 50000 *French* Troops, even on their own Frontiers; and an Over-Match for 70000 if they paſs the *Rhine*, and venture into *Germany*, as Experience has demonſtrated. I ſhall conclude with obſerving, Fifthly, that as the *German* Princes and States have been but very lately releaſed from the Influence of an *Auſtrian* Emperor, which as I have ſhewn was a Kind of Influence extremely detrimental to their Intereſt, ſo it is not a little uncertain, what uſe they may make of their Freedom; but the Probability is that they will uſe it for their own Security. This is evident, that in her laſt Attempt, *France* did not depend upon her own Power, or upon the numerous Armies ſhe ſent into *Germany*, but principally upon her Alliances with *German* Princes, and the Diſcoveries they made of their Inclinations to lay hold of the

preſent

preſent Juncture, to ſecure themſelves againſt all future Apprehenſions, from the Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, by diſmembring its Dominions, and dividing them among themſelves. It was this, and principally the Share the King of *Pruſſia* offered to take in it, that drew *France* into acting as ſhe did, contrary to the Sentiments of Cardinal *Fleury*, who, with great good Senſe, maintained that even the Accompliſhment of this Project would prove prejudicial to *France*.

The ancient and preſent State of *Germany* being thus compared, I think it is impoſſible for any reaſonable Man to doubt, that the latter is infinitely ſuperior to the former, notwithſtanding what *Cluverius* has advanced, who ſpeaks only of the Extent of Territory; for in his Opinion the ancient *Germany* comprehended the three Northern Kingdoms; but Extent of Territory; and a Multitude of barbarous People is a Strength far inferior to that of a well governed and a well diſciplined Nation. It is alſo evident, that for many Centuries *Germany* has been the natural Ballance to *France*, and in that Reſpect of great Conſequence to *Europe*. But then there is another Thing to be obſerved, which is this, that the Force of *Germany* was always ſuperior to that of *France*, and became of equal Weight, only by the Variation of the Ballance of Power in *Germany*. If the Emperor *Charles* V. could have made himſelf as abſolute there, as he had done in *Spain*, and the Low Countries, and even in *Italy*, by overturning their reſpective Conſtitutions, he would unqueſtionably have been too hard for *France*, which was the Reaſon that our *Henry* VIII. oppoſed him, and joined with *Francis* I. the Pope, and other *Italian* Princes. The Reformation created a new Ballance of Power in *Germany*, in Reſpect to which our

Concern

Concern for Religion obliged us frequently to take a Part, as it afterwards did the King of *Sweden*; and as I have ſhewn the abſolute Neceſſity of having Recourſe to foreign Powers to poize the Weight of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and the popiſh Princes who adhered to it, made the *German* Princes conceive it their Intereſt, to give a Part of their Country on one ſide to the *French*, and on the other to the Kings of *Sweden* and *Denmark*. After the Treaty of *Munſter*, or, to ſpeak more correctly, after the Treaties of *Weſtphalia*, which comprehend thoſe of *Oſnabrugh* and *Munſter*, the old Ballance of Power took Place; and from that Time it became very difficult for the Maritime Powers, to diſtinguiſh their own Intereſt with Reſpect to *Germany*; for on the one Hand, it was frequently neceſſary to ſupport the Emperor, in order to preſerve the Ballance of *Europe*; and on the other Hand, it was ſometimes as neceſſary, both from religious and political Conſiderations, to aſſiſt the *German* Princes, in order to preſerve the Ballance of Power in *Germany*, the Fluctuation of which, and the crafty Management of the Scales, has been for ſeventy Years paſt the true Source of the *French* Power. This was firſt diſcovered by Cardinal *Richlieu*, and has been the great Secret of all their Miniſters ever ſince, though none of them ever underſtood it ſo well as the laſt. It was the original Opinion of Cardinal *Fleury*, that *France* ought to have executed her Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction in the utmoſt Strictneſs, nay even to have given her Intereſt in the enſuing Election to the Duke of *Lorrain*; for this plain Reaſon, that it would have preſerved the old Ballance, which they knew by Experience they were very well able to manage, for their own Advantage. But as he very wiſely obſerved, the raiſing

raiſing the Elector of *Bavaria* to the Empire, was deſtroying the old Ballance, in order to eſtabliſh a new one, the Effects of which could not be known or foreſeen, and as to the Partition of the *Auſtrian* Dominions, it might as well prove the Ruin of *France* as of that Houſe. For in Order to bring this about, there was a Neceſſity of uniting the Houſes of *Bavaria*, *Saxony*, and *Brandenburgh*; and in Caſe they had carried their Point, and had fixed themſelves in the entire Poſſeſſion of the Dominions of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, any two of theſe Powers without, and any one of them in Conjunction with the Empire, muſt have been an Over-Match for *France*. As it is not the Power only, but the very Safety of that Nation, I might ſay the Being of it, hangs at preſent on a ſingle Thread; whenever the preſent Emperor deſerts them, the *French* muſt be ſooner or latter undone. How far depriving him of his hereditary Dominions, exhauſting them to the laſt Shilling, and blowing up all his Fortreſſes may further this Purpoſe, or how far a publick Declaration, that the Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria* is to be reſtored, in its utmoſt Extent, may contribute thereto, or to the proper Eſtabliſhment of a Ballance of Power in *Europe*, is a Point not eaſily to be diſcuſſed, though it certainly is of the laſt Importance, and that upon which the Safety, Peace and Proſperity of all *Europe* muſt depend.

We are now advanced to the Third, which I eſteem the hardeſt Part of this Treatiſe, but as I hope I have hitherto maintained the Character of a fair and diligent Writer, ſo I ſhall ſpare no Pains in what is to follow; not ſo much from any Proſpect of Praiſe, as from an earneſt Deſire of doing the Nation Service, which I muſt certainly

do

do, if I can either excite a Spirit of Frugality, or oblige the Patrons of our preſent expenſive Meaſures, to exhibit their Reaſons for them in a clearer and more convenient Manner, than they have hitherto done, ſo that either we may ſave our Money, or be ſatisfied that it is ſpent to ſome purpoſe. In making ſuch an Enquiry, we ſhall but follow the Steps of our Anceſtors, who never patiently ſubmitted, to the raiſing of heavy Taxes, without expoſtulating with thoſe who had the Management of them, as to the Motives of their impoſing, and the Manner in which they were employed. They had likewiſe Concerns abroad as well as we, and took a great deal of Pains ſo to manage them, as that they might be to their Advantage. One would conceive therefore, ſince the Form of our Government is ſtill in a great Meaſure the ſame, that ſome Benefit might be reaped from a Review of their Conduct. To avoid however running into a dry, tedious, and in ſome Meaſure uſeleſs Deduction of Facts, I will content myſelf with a few obvious Reflections, on ſuch Capital Points as ſeem to be common both to them and to us.

One of the moſt ancient, and leaſt varied Maxims of our Government, ſeems to have been the Love of Peace, in preference to all the Advantages that could be propoſed from Conqueſt, all the Reputation that might ariſe from Valour and Victory, and all the Benefits that might reſult from fixing the Ballance of Power to our liking: Thus in the fifth Year of our victorious *Edward* III. it appears by the Rolls, that a Parliament was called in order to deviſe how Peace might be beſt procured. In the ſeventeenth of the ſame Prince, we find on the Rolls a Petition of the Lords and Commons, entreating him to make Peace with

France, and adviſing him to demand the Mediation of the Pope, which it ſeems he did, but to little Purpoſe, for the War ſtill continued, ſo that in his twentieth Year, he found it requiſite to direct the Biſhops and Clergy throughout the Land to open to the People, in their Sermons, the juſt Cauſes of the War, the great Unwillingneſs of the King to cauſe the Effuſion of chriſtian Blood, the Obſtinacy of the Enemy, and the hard Neceſſity he was under of continuing the War. Two Years afterwards we find him acknowledgeing in Parliament, that the War had brought *gravia Onera & multa Mala*, heavy Burthens, and great Miſchiefs on his People, wherefore he declares it was his Intention to go over in Perſon to *France*, in order to treat of Peace, directing in the mean Time his Biſhops, Clergy and People to offer up humble and devout Prayers to God, to direct this Action to the Glory of his Creator, the Peace of his native Country, and the Advantage of the whole Chriſtian World, which he believed could not follow but from a firm Amity with his Neighbours. I ſpeak all this out of the Record, and much more I might alledge to the ſame Purpoſe under this and other Reigns; ſo little Truth is there in the common Opinion, that our Kings heretofore were altogether abſolute, and governed as they thought fit, without any Reſpect either to the Good of their Subjects, or to the Sentiments they had of them. As a further Proof of this, I cannot help taking Notice of another Record in the ſame Reign, which is ſtill preſerved in the Tower, wherein the King ſays, that not through his own Deſire, but from the unforeſeen Events of War, he had been driven to vaſt Expences, he therefore, addreſſing himſelf to the Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*, prays, *Quod cum Populus Regni ſui variis*

variis Oneribus, Tellagiis & Impoſitionibus, ut idem Archiepiſc. Indulgentiarum muneribus, plus Exhortationibus & aliis modis eundem Populum placare ſtudeat, & ipſum Regem excuſet, that ſince the Subjects of his Kingdom were over-charged with many Burthens, Tallages and other Impoſitions, the ſaid Archbiſhop would by grant of Indulgences, ſeaſonable Exhortations and other Ways endeavour to pacify the People, and excuſe the King. We may conclude from hence, that the beſt and braveſt of our Kings were no Enemies to the juſt Liberties of the Subjects, but naturally expected that in Caſe their Expences exceeded their ſettled Income, ſo that they were forced to aſk the Aid of their Subjects, they ſhould become anſwerable to them for the Sums levied upon them; and this you ſee does not extend only to the laying Accounts before a Parliament, but the giving full Satisfaction to the Nation. King *Edward* did not fear his Subjects Diſobedience, his own Power and the Laws of the Land ſecured that, but what he apprehended was the Loſs of their Affection; he thought it was the Part of a Tyrant to rule over the Bodies, and exhauſt the Eſtates of his People, and that it became a King to have Dominion over their Hearts.

There was another Point in which they were no leſs clear, and that was the Affecting, under pretence either of Glory or Gain, to preſerve great Dominions on the Continent. *Matthew Paris* tells us, that *William* the Conqueror made it his ſole Buſineſs to ſcrape together Money, juſtly, or injuſtly was all one to him, and when he had got it, he tranſported it to *Normandy*; of his Son *William*, he ſays, that to keep that Province he ſtead *England*, and he ſays much the ſame thing of *Henry* I. The ſame Reflections occur in our beſt Writers, as to every Reign, while we had

any Footing in *France*; and even the keeping of *Calais* was a Burthen to us, ſo that out of pure Policy Queen *Elizabeth* never ſtruggled heartily for its Recovery. But what principally galled the *Engliſh*, under the Princes of the *Norman* Race, was their being Subjects, in Reſpect to their foreign Dominions, to the King of *France*. They were at their Wits End when they ſaw their royal Letters addreſſed to the *French* Monarch, in theſe Words, To our Sovereign Lord the King of *France*. They could not help thinking themſelves a Province, while their Princes were obliged to uſe this Style, and with a View to ſhake it off they ſo frequently conſented to their King's laying claim to that Crown, which yet upon Reflection they found attended with as mortifying Circumſtances. On this account, we find that by two Acts of Parliament, the firſt in the fourteenth of *Edward* III. and the ſecond in the eighth of *Henry* V. they provided that the Subjects of *England* ſhould owe no Obedience to the King as King of *France*, nor the Kingdom of *England* be in any wiſe ſubjected by ſuch a Union to that Crown. At laſt, in the ſeventeenth of *Henry* VI. when a Supply was demanded for the Recovery of that Crown, the Commons anſwered plainly, that the gaining *France* would only afford a Colour for the King's going often abroad thither, by which Abſence he muſt neceſſarily occaſion great Decay, and Deſolation to this State, beſides tranſporting of our Money, which would enrich that Country, and impoveriſh their own, and therefore they refuſed it. No Man certainly, who has a real Concern for his Country, can deny that our Anceſtors reaſoned right, or can heſitate a Moment, whether he ought to applaud their Conduct, or not, who preferred their own Safety,

and

and the Eaſe of their Poſterity to this fond Paſſion of the King's for a Deſtructive Grandeur on the other Side of the Water.

We find yet another Circumſtance which gave our Fore-fathers great Pain, and that was the Subſidies, which ſome of their Monarchs thought fit to pay to foreign Princes, in order to ſerve them as Auxiliaries. *Edward* I. paid the Nobility of *Brabant*, an annual Subſidy of thirty thouſand pounds, to aſſiſt him againſt the *French* King; for the ſame purpoſe, he afterwards thought fit to grant 100,000 to the Earl of *Flanders*; no leſs than a Million to the Earl of *Guilders*, and 1,600,000 to the Duke of *Lorrain*, and all to little or no purpoſe. *Edward* III. fell into the ſame Snare, and expended immenſe Sums of Money with a like View; and ſo did many others of our Princes, to the great Grief of their Subjects, who frequently complained that they were impoveriſhed to gratify the avaritious Deſires of Foreigners, that were never to be ſatisfied. Such Complaints were ſometimes diſpleaſing to our Princes, who could not endure being croſſed in their favourite Deſigns, but this however did not diſcourage their Subjects, or hinder them from ſpeaking their Minds freely: Thus when *Richard* II. by his ſtrange Management, both of foreign and domeſticks Concerns, came to be in ſuch Diſtreſs, that he demanded of the Houſe of Commons, a Supply for the Maintenance of his Houſhold, they pleaded extreme Poverty in Barr to his Relief, complaining that all good Money was tranſported abroad, and that they were forced to make ſhift with what was debaſed to carry on the little Trade they had at Home; that by his fruitleſs War, the Price of Wool was fallen, to their utter Impoveriſhment; they added that the King's Wants were occaſioned by the Ill-

management

management of his Revenue, and therefore they demanded in the firſt Place, that his preſent Offices ſhould be removed, conſenting at laſt to tax themſelves, with this Limitation, that their Money ſhould be received, expended, and accounted for to themſelves, and by Treaſurers of their own Election. Such are the Precedents tranſmitted to us by former Times, ſuch in Days of Yore was the Spirit of the *Engliſh* Nation, ſuch were the Rights they aſſumed, as derived to them by the Conſtitution, that very Conſtitution which we ſtill enjoy. Some Favourers and Flatterers of a Court may poſſibly treat theſe as old muſty Remarks, drwan out of mouldy Records, to ſtir up Sedition and Diſcontent. But whatever they may ſay, I think it my Duty to remark that it was by theſe Steps our Fore-fathers maintained their Freedom, and tranſmitted to us the Liberties we now enjoy. It is moſt true they were not themſelves conſtantly poſſeſſed of them, but there never was a Time in which they did not claim them, nor was it ſaid in the Petition of Right to King *Charles* I. or in the Bill of Rights which paſſed ſoon after the Revolution, that theſe were new Privileges granted to, or extorted by the People; but they are expreſly confeſſed to have been always theirs, and thoſe Laws are declaratory only of the Liberties tranſmitted to us from the moſt ancient Times.

The Ballance of Power in *Europe*, though perhaps that ſpecific Phraſe might not be uſed, was an old miniſterial Scheme, for engaging the People to part with their Money, without telling them that the King, beſides the Expences of his Government, from which they enjoyed Protection, expected large Sums out of their Pockets to gratify his Ambition; For preventative Wars, like preventative Phyſick, have rarely had any other Effect

with

with us, than to ſtir Ill-humours, and ſo add Factions at Home to Broils abroad. It muſt however be admitted, that even our wiſeſt and moſt cautious Princes have not been unattentive to the Affairs of the Continent, but then their Attention has never drawn them into Wars, but on the contrary proved the Means of keeping their Neighbours out of them; whereas Princes, of another Character, who were fond of Parade, and never thought themſelves Monarchs ſo much as when they had an Army for their Retinue, have lived in a continual Buſtle, and brought both themſelves, and their Subjects to the deepeſt Diſtreſs; for we may lay it down as a Thing certain, that this Nation has always thriven by Peace, and ſuffered by War, except where it has been made in Defence of our juſt Rights, and chiefly by a Naval Force. To lay this down as my Opinion, is doing Nothing; to enter into a long Hiſtorical Detail in ſupport of what I have ſaid, would be impoſing a needleſs, as well as tedious Task upon the Reader; to avoid therefore both Errors, I ſhall content myſelf with a few Remarks upon three of the moſt conſiderable Reigns, in our Hiſtory, which will fully demonſtrate the Doctrine for which I plead, to be as well ſupported by Experience, as it is viſibly founded on Reaſon; and I beſeech the Reader to conſider, what the Conſequence muſt be of Meaſures irreconcileable to neither, ſupported only by bold Aſſertions, and florid Declarations, which when examined to the bottom, are found to be repugnant to both.

Henry VII. was juſtly ſtiled the *Engliſh Solomon*, and a moſt wiſe Prince he was, in whatever Light we conſider him. He united the Lines of *York* and *Lancaſter*, and became thereby the Founder of a new Family. He reformed our Conſtitution, and

and by opening to the Commons an Highway to Property, became the Author of our Liberties, as in the moderate Demands he made, through the Courſe of his long Reign, he ſhewed himſelf the Father of his Subjects. He ſhewed his Power by arming once againſt *France*, and his Wiſdom by accepting a certain Advantage, to lay down his Arms, rather than riſk an uncertain War. He contracted Alliances with all foreign States, and punctually fulfilled them; he declared himſelf the Patron of Sciences and Commerce, and he effectually encouraged both. Under his Auſpice, it was the famous *Cabot* diſcovered *Newfoundland* and *North-America*; but though this wiſe Prince neglected nothing that might redound either to the particular Advantage of his Family, or to the general good of his Subjects, yet he prudently avoided foreign Wars, and contented himſelf with becoming the Arbiter of *Europe*, by aggrandizing his own Kingdom, through the laudable Arts of a ſteady Policy, which preſerved his People for many Years in profound Peace. It is indeed objected to his Memory, that he was too thirfty a Prince; happy Objection! when ſhall we ſee it made again? It is likewiſe ſaid, that he put penal Statutes too ſtrictly in execution, which our celebrated Hiſtorian the famous Lord *Herbert* of *Cherbury*, tells us brought a ſevere, and arbitrary Judgment, on the Inſtruments of his Oppreſſion *Empſon* and *Dudley*. There is ſome Truth in the former, for deſiring to live on his own Revenue, he endeavoured to make the moſt of it, and therefore reſumed many of the Offices which had been granted by *Edward* IV. and *Richard* III. But the latter is abſolutely falſe, as the Reader may ſee in the Lord Chief Juſtice *Anderſon*'s Reports,

where

where we have the Record of *Empſon*'s Conviction at large; which proves that this crafty Lawyer was hit by an Indictment, drawn by one of his own Profeſſion, and found guilty by a common Jury; and yet this mighty Revenue with all theſe Arts, was raiſed no higher than £120,000 a Year, as appears from a ſtated Account of *Dudley*'s, which is yet in being. Out of this Revenue, beſides what he expended in building the famous Chappel at *Weſtminſter*, and his noble Palace at *Richmond*, he left behind him a Treaſure, which conſidering the Age he lived in, if we had not ſo many great Authorities agreeing in the Account, we could ſcarce be brought to credit, ſince it amounted to no leſs, than Four Millions and an Half in ready Money.

His Son and Succeſſor *Henry* VIII. purſued quite a different Conduct, he was a more buſtling though not a more active Prince than his Father, and ſo fond of holding the Ballance of Power, that he would needs have a Finger in every Quarrel, that happened throughout *Europe*; he raiſed ten times as much upon his Subjects as his Father had done, beſides ſquandering away all the Treaſure he left him, and this chiefly by aſſiſting foreign Princes, from one vainglorious Motive or other. Thus pretty early in his Reign, he remitted vaſt Sums for the uſe of the Emperor *Maximilian*, to enable him to become Maſter of the City of *Verona* in *Italy*, by which wiſe Conduct his Miniſter, Cardinal *Wolſey*, tells us, *nullum aliud factum, niſi Damnum & Dedecus peperit*, nothing accrued to him but Loſs, and Diſhonour; for when the Emperor had got the City, he not only gave it up to the King of *France*, but threatned to join with that King againſt his Benefactor *Henry*, believing as Cardinal

Wolsey says in the same Letter, that as his Majesty had been formerly persuaded, so now he might be bullied out of his Money, by Huffing and hard Words. Yet he persisted for many Years in the same Sort of Measures, plundering his Subjects at Home, that he might make a mighty Figure abroad, 'till at last though he was still dreadful here, he became so ridiculous there, that an *Italian* Wit drew him in the middle of a Triangle, with *Moses*, *Christ* and *Mahomet*, at the three Corners, with these Words proceeding by a Label out of his Mouth, *Quo me vertam nescio*, which Way to turn me I know not; as if after all the stir he had made about Religion, he would have turned *Jew*, nay *Turk*, to have got rid of his Necessities. Yet this Monarch did not want Parts, or good Privy-Councellors, but his hasty, boisterous, tyrannical Temper kept them all so much in Awe, that to gratify his Humour, they sacrificed their own Judgments, and which was infinitely worse, sacrificed the Good of their Country.

His Daughter *Elizabeth* inherited her Grandfather's Virtues, without being tainted with her Father's Vices, she came to the Crown not only from a private Condition, but from a Prison, where one could scarce have imagined she had studied the Art of Government; she found the Nation in most wretched Circumstances, distressed and impoverished at Home, and at the same Time engaged in a War abroad, in Support of an Interest opposite to her own. Her Finances were not only exhausted, but the Strength of the Nation so impaired, that there was not a Fortress in a Condition of Defence, or a Squadron of Ships fit for Service. Besides all this she had a Pretender to her Crown, with a very plausible

Title,

Title, to which a great Part of her Subjects were much affected, and the moſt potent Prince on the Continent firſt a ſuſpected Friend, and in Time an open Enemy; yet from all theſe Difficulties ſhe delivered herſelf, with very little Aſſiſtance from her Subjects, and by that Time ſhe had reigned ten Years, had ſaved £700,000, which ſerved her when ſhe came to be involved in very great and withal unavoidable Expences. She was obliged to interfere with the Affairs of her Neighbours, to prevent the Ruin of her own, ſhe ſent a great deal of Money into *Scotland*, but then ſhe kept the Nation in conſtant dependance; ſhe aſſiſted the *Dutch*, but would not take Words in full Payment, ſhe was pleaſed perhaps that they owned upon their Coin, the very being of their State to the Favour of God and the Aſſiſtance of Queen *Elizabeth*, but ſhe took for all that cautionary Towns by Way of Pawn for £800,000 which ſhe had lent them. She expended upwards of £400,000 in elevating the Houſe of *Bourbon*, but then ſhe did it to raiſe a Competitor to *Philip* II. of *Spain*, who had often attempted the Conqueſt of her Dominions. In the midſt of theſe dangerous Wars, and prodigious Expences, ſhe was truly a Mother to her People, and in the ſtricteſt Senſe of the Word, the Miſtreſs of her Miniſters; ſhe humbled the Pride of the haughty *Dudley*, and as appears from his own Letters could never be made the Dupe even of *Cecil's* Cunning. In ſhort ſhe was in every Reſpect a Queen; when the Neceſſities of the State required it, ſhe asked her Subjects for Money without Ceremony, and it was given her without Grumbling. Once it fell out, that the ſuppoſed Neceſſity blew over, after the Money was raiſed, but ſhe was too wiſe a Woman to

pocket it, ſhe made a better uſe of it, ſhe returned it to her Subjects. In all her long and glorious Reign, ſhe received by Grants from Parliament not quite Three Millions. Such was that Princeſs who lived the Delight and Wonder of her own Age, as her Reign, and her Government muſt be the Aſtoniſhment of ours. Such were the Meaſures by which ſhe ſecured Safety to herſelf, Honour to her Subjects, and at the ſame Time preſerved the Ballance of Power in *Europe*, without being a Dupe to Foreigners.

The great and general Complaint almoſt of every Writer, who has touched the Reign of her Succeſſor, is that he was no Hero. He ſpent a great deal of Money in the Cauſe of his Son-in-Law, the Elector *Palatine*, but he did not care to engage the Nation in a War, with the Houſe of *Auſtria*, upon his Account; his Negotiations with *Spain* were ill conducted, how well ſoever they might be attended; and his intermeddling in *Holland*, about the Election of Divinity Profeſſors, appears as juſtly ridiculous to us, as perhaps ſome Acts of our own may look in the Eyes of Poſterity. But with all the Faults and Failings of this pacifick, or if you will, this puſilanimous Prince, yet under his Reign, it was that our Trade extended to all Parts of the World, and the Commons of *England* grew rich. Theſe are Facts that cannot be diſputed, if we rely upon thoſe Authorities, or give Credit to ſuch Teſtimonies, as would convince us in any other Caſe. For if we look into that great Collection of Voyages, that was made by Dr. *Purchas*, we ſhall there find that almoſt every beneficial Branch of Trade, with which the Nation is now bleſſed, was attempted, if not ſettled at this Time; and it has been long ago obſerved that the Wealth accruing

cruing from hence, occaſioned in a great Meaſure, thoſe Heats in Parliament, which diſturbed his Government. It was therefore no bad Advice that his Miniſters gave, to avoid foreign Wars during theſe domeſtick Diſtractions. They ſaw plainly to what the Humour of the People tended, and rightly judged that the Eagerneſs which ſome expreſſed for War abroad was founded in the Hopes of turning it to the Advantage of their Faction at Home; this appeared more plainly afterwards, when many of our martial Nobility and Gentry, who had been trained up in the Wars in *Germany*, threw themſelves into the Parliament Army.

King *Charles* I. found a War with *Spain* ready prepared for him, when he came to the Crown, with an empty Exchequer, and his Kingdom full of Fears, Jealouſies and Diſcontents; he embarked ſoon after in a *French* War, and endeavoured to make himſelf popular by giving Aſſiſtance to the *French* Proteſtants, but failed in part and in the whole; for he was neither able to do them good, or perſuade his own Subjects that he heartily intended it; though it appears from the Duke of *Rohan*'s Memoirs, who was beſt able to diſcern, and moſt likely to ſpeak Truth, that the King was extremely earneſt in the Affair, and would have effectually ſuccoured the Proteſtants, if he had either had better Miniſters, or more obedient Subjects. But it ſo happened that not only in this, but in another Inſtance, when by fitting a great Fleet to Sea, he diſappointed a Scheme entered into by the *French* and *Dutch* for dividing the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, he not only diſturbed his own Quiet, but provoked his Neighbours to ſeek Revenge, which was all he got by interfering with Affairs on the Continent. *Buck-*

ingham's

ingham's languid Adminiſtration ruined him, that Favourite's fondneſs for his own Family, the Notions he had infuſed into the King's Head, that all who diſliked his Meaſures were Enemies to the King's Authority, drew his Majeſty to act in ſuch a Manner, as if he had preferred being Protector of the *Buckingham* Faction, to the being King of three great Nations. At laſt he ſaw his Error in ſome Meaſure, but took an odd Way of amending it; he raiſed *Wentworth*, the warmeſt Perſecutor of his late Miniſter, to the ſame envied Height of Power, which drove the Party he left from Diſcontent to Diſaffection; they oppoſed and misrepreſented every thing the King did, libelled him as a Friend to Popery and *France*, while themſelves were deep in *French* and Popiſh Intrigues. They were continually repreſenting all the Errors of his Government in the ſtrongeſt Lights, and made uſe of his Inclination to be well with his Subjects, to ſtrip him of his juſt Prerogatives, and to overturn the Ballance of our Conſtitution. All this could never have happened if he had ſtudied the Preſervation of Peace, and living within the Compaſs of his Revenue, from the Time he aſcended the Throne, and either taken in, as was once propoſed, all the Patriot Chiefs, or had never taken off *Wentworth*, whoſe enterpriſing Genius prov'd the King's Ruin, and his own; leaving thereby a moſt inſtructive Leſſon to future Kings and Miniſters.

The next Government that was ſettled in *England* was that of the Parliament, and though no Man has a greater Abhorrence than I, for that unnatural Rebellion, to which they owed their Power, yet I muſt ſincerely profeſs that they managed ſo wiſely, and for the ſhort Time they held

held it, made their Country much more conſiderable, than it ever was before, chiefly by their ſteady Conduct in reſpect to foreign Affairs; they courted indifferently the Friendſhip and Alliance of all the Princes and States of *Europe*, and at the ſame time ſhewed a noble Reſolution to do themſelves Juſtice, againſt any that either queſtioned their Authority, or attempted to diſtreſs their Subjects. This it was that induced them to bear ſo much as they did with *Spain*, where their Ambaſſador had been murdered, becauſe they knew the Conſequence of the *Spaniſh* Trade to *India*; and this prompted them to exert themſelves ſo vigouroufly againſt the *Dutch*, notwithſtanding the low State of their Marine, at the time that War began. Their Succeſs was the Effect of their Heroic Reſolution, and that Zeal with which they applied themſelves to the providing effectually whatever was neceſſary for the publick Service. But the Ambition of *Cromwell*, and the inſatiable Avarice of ſome principle Commanders in their Army, ſoon put an End to their Government, and ſet up that of a ſingle Perſon, without any Colour of Right, but what he derived from his Power over his Soldiers. The Protector *Oliver* acted upon Principles oppoſite to thoſe of the Parliament; for whereas they ſtudied the Nation's Intereſt, he purſued his own. The Figure he made in *Europe* was entirely owing to the Conduct of the Parliament, and when he came to govern alone, he acted worſe than any of our Princes had ever done; for he ſtript the People at Home of every ſort of Liberty, while he ſacrificed their Intereſt abroad to thoſe of his Tyranical Government, and upſtart Family. He entered into a War with *Spain*, in order to plunder her Colonies, and he failed in this Deſign,

ſign by refuſing the Soldiers and Sailors their Share in the Plunder, which was abſolutely the Cauſe of their ſhameful Behaviour in *Hiſpaniola*. He concurred in raiſing the Power of *France* to ſuch a Height, as it could never otherwiſe have arrived at, and furniſhed *Mazarine* with the Means of humbling the Houſe of *Auſtria* to ſuch a Degree, as hath intailed upon us all the Expence we have ſince been at, to ſupport that Family againſt *France*. In ſhort, we owe either to his want of Knowledge, or to his want of Honeſty, all the Confuſions that followed in *Europe*, as we owe to his overturning the Power of the Parliament, the Loſs of that ſupreme Authority, to which they would have raiſed this Nation, in reſpect to its Neighbours; for they had a juſt Notion of the Ballance of Power, and knew how to have held the Scales, even without that haughty Air of dictating to all they had any Concerns with, which was his great failing, and from which, notwithſtanding by an unaccountable Partiality, he derives moſt of his Reputation.

I wiſh the curious and impartial Reader would examine this Matter carefully, for I dare aſſure him, that theſe Obſervations are founded on Facts, and that they are not made with a View of ſerving any Party, or to prejudice any Syſtem, but purely if the Thing be practicable to come at Truth. Yet to open the Matter a little further, let me obſerve that in all this Period of Time, if we except it may be Ten Years, we were gaining immenſe Sums by Trade; for from the Peace with *Spain*, in the Beginning of the Reign of King *James*, to the Year 1641, we were moſtly in Peace, and exported vaſt Quantities of our Commodities and Manufactures into all Parts of the World; and for the ſhort Wars in which we

were

were engaged, though they weakened the Government they did not much diminiſh the Strength of the Nation, for they were managed by our Fleets, the Expences of which paſſing only from Hand to Hand amongſt ourſelves, could not greatly hurt the Nation; and even for our civil Wars, they did not until within the two or three laſt Years occaſion much detriment to our Commerce. And to ſhew that I am abſolutely impartial, and have not the leaſt Inclination to miſrepreſent any Government, that has ſubſiſted in this Iſland, I will readily admit, that the immediate Miſchief of *Cromwell's* ill-grounded War with *Spain*, was in ſome Meaſure ballanced by the Money brought into the Nation by Admiral *Montague*; but at the ſame time I inſiſt it was ballanced only in Part, for the great Blow given by *Blake* to the *Spaniards*, hurt us as much as it did them, though it certainly raiſed the Reputation of our Maritime Power, and is deſervedly reckoned the boldeſt Action that ever was performed by the *Engliſt* Navy. It was in thoſe Days computed, that beſides the Silver we took, the *Spaniards* loſt between 7 and 8,000,000*l.* Sterling, of which according to the Courſe of our Trade before the War, we muſt have received upwards of 3,000,000*l.* beſide, this ſo weakened the Houſe of *Auſtria*, that ſhe never afterwards recovered it, which brought great Expences upon us, from our being obliged to defend her Dominions in the *Netherlands*. To evince the Truth of this, I ſhall preſently produce from the Records of the Mint, an Account of the Money coined within this Period, which will put the Matter out of Queſtion; but before I do this, I beg leave to make ſome further Obſervations. The Miſchief occaſioned by *Cromwell's* War

with *Spain*, was not only felt in the Loſs of our Trade with that Nation, in the taking of our Ships by *Spaniards*, and of Privateers under their Colours, by the Weakening the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and Strengthening the Houſe of *Bourbon*, but alſo by the entire Loſs of ſo large a Sum as 7,000,000*l.* in Silver, to the whole trading World; ſo that this wrong-headed Notion of diſtreſſing the *Spaniards* brought irreparable Damage to us, and to the reſt of the trading Nations in *Europe*, with whom the whole of that Sum muſt in Time have been laid out, and have continued to circulate to this Time; beſides we had then a large Ballance of Trade, ariſing from the particular Ballances of moſt Nations we dealt with, and as they drew the Silver, with which they paid theſe Ballances, from *Spain*, we muſt have been conſiderable Lofers in our general Trade, as well as by the peculiar Detriment we ſuffered from not having our Share of that Money, to which our direct Trade with *Spain* might have intitled us. Theſe are Points that deſerve to be conſidered, becauſe I doubt we are yet too much of Opinion, that in all Wars, the Damage done to the Enemy is juſt ſo much gained to ourſelves, whereas a Multitude of unforeſeen Accidents may render it otherwiſe, and as in the preſent Caſe, make the Enemies Loſs our own too. For as the Trade of any Nation cannot be driven to Advantage, without a certain Quantity of current Caſh, ſo the Trade of *Europe*, and indeed of the Univerſe, requires in like Manner a proportionable quantity of Bullion, the leſſening of which muſt be attended with the ſame Inconveniences, as the leſſening the Quantity of running Caſh in any particular Nation. On the whole therefore I ſay that our living ſo great a Part of this Period in profound

Peace,

Peace, our concerning ourſelves but little with the Affairs on the Continent, and ſending abroad ſcarce any Money upon that Account, prove the Means of our obtaining a great Ballance of Trade in our Favour, which brought annually conſiderable Sums of Gold and Silver into this Country, the Proportion of which, if not the exact Quantity, may be gathered from our Coinage, which, for Reaſons I have not Room to mention here, was very regular, all that Time, ſerving in this Reſpect as a commercial Barometer, by which the Strength and the Wealth of the Nation might be eaſily meaſured; and now therefore I come to that Account, which I have promiſed during this Space of Time.

An Account of the Money coined in England, *for Fifty Eight Years.*

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
From *October* 1599, to *March* 1619.	4,779,314	13	4
From *March* 1619, to *March* 1638.	6,900,042	11	1
From *March* 1638, to *March* 1657.	7,733,521	13	4
	19,412,878	17	9

After the Reſtoration of King *Charles* II. the Conduct of the Court of *Great Britain*, had a very great Influence upon all the Affairs of *Europe*. This was extremely well underſtood by the famous Earl of *Clarendon*, who though cenſured by Biſhop *Burnet*, for interfering too much in foreign Affairs, yet we who live at a greater

Diſtance from his Times, and conſequently are better able to diſcern how far his Maxims were founded in Truth and Experience, and how far they were juſtified or condemned by Events, are bound to think in another Manner; for in the firſt Place, it is very certain that the Earl oppoſed the Sale of *Dunkirk* to the *French*, though he was one of the Commiſſioners impowered to treat for it, becauſe he foreſaw that this would raiſe a Clamour at Home, and ſtrengthen the Hands of the *French* King abroad. His Scheme of Politicks was founded on a very few Maxims, from which he thought there was no deviating without Danger. He was deſirous of maintaining as long, and as far as it was poſſible a general Peace, and for entering into ſuch Alliances, as might reſtrain the *French* Power, without exhauſting our own. From theſe Motives he oppoſed the firſt *Dutch* War, in that Reign, becauſe, how juſt ſoever theGrounds of it might be, his Sentiments were that the Maritime Powers ought always to live in the ſtricteſt Unity. After that War was concluded, and the Earl of *Clarendon* baniſhed, the King for ſome time managed his own Affairs, and for the Space of Fifteen Months was eſteemed by all *Europe* the greateſt, wiſeſt, and honeſteſt Prince that ever filled the *Britiſh* Throne. For in that Space of Time, *viz.* in *January* 1668, he concluded the famous tripple Alliance, by which in Conjunction with the States-General, and the Crown of *Sweden*, he ſet Bounds to the Ambition of *France*, and effectually ſecured the Peace of *Europe:* Yet all the Force mentioned in this Treaty to be furniſhed on either Side, was no more than Forty Men of War of different Rates, 6000 Foot, and 400 Horſe, or an Equivalent for them in Money.

ney. So long as this Treaty ſubſiſted, he was a powerful and a happy Prince. But when by the Acts of *France*, and the Caballing of his own Subjects he was drawn from it, he ceaſed thence forward to be either a great or a happy King, and ſpent his Life in continual uneaſineſs. The War of 1672, though it might not be groundleſs, was moſt certainly infamous, ſince he thereby ſacrificed the Intereſts of his Subjects, and the Liberties of *Europe*, to gratify his Reſentments. He acted in this upon *Cromwell*'s Motives, and with the ſame execrable View, that is, he endeavoured to eſtabliſh an arbitary Authority by the Aſſiſtance of *France*, and in order to this acted in direct Repugnance to the Rules of right Policy, as well as againſt the Inclination of his Subjects. But the King was then in the Hands of the very worſt Miniſtry, with which this Nation was ever curſt, a Crew of renegado Patriots, who had oppoſed the King, while he acted upon right Principles, and had ruined by their Arts the beſt Miniſter the Nation ever had. Theſe Men had forced themſelves into Power, and endeavoured to preſerve it by flattering him with a Scheme of abſolute Authority. As they had ſerved their Country without Sincerity, ſo now they ſerved the King without Loyalty; and when from a Foreſight of the Miſchiefs their mad Management would have brought upon him, his Majeſty refuſed to go their Lengths, *Buckingham* and *Shaftsbury* turned Patriots again, that is to ſay pretended to be ſo, and perplexed his Affairs as long as he and they lived. By this ſtrange Conduct, by this Want of Steadineſs, by his minding Pleaſure too much, and Buſineſs too little, the King loſt the Confidence of his Subjects, and Allies, and thenceforward fell into a Dependance

on

on *France*, which was not only contrary to his Intereſt, but far enough from being agreeable to his Inclinations. This led him to think of governing by Corruption, the meaneſt and moſt dangerous Method an *Engliſh* Monarch can ever purſue, and which ſooner or later has been and will be the Ruin of every Prince who is drawn to it. Inſtead of conſulting his Parliament as the free Repreſentatives of his People, he endeavoured by Places and Penſions, to make them the Creatures of his Will, and the Supporters of an illegal Power, by which he deſtroyed his own Credit and theirs, which will be everlaſtingly the Caſe of any Prince who acts upon ſuch Maxims.

But it ſo fell out, that there was at that Time too great a Portion of public Spirit for him to ſubdue. Some of the Members who had been his beſt Friends, and that too from Principle, revolted; particularly Sir *Thomas Clarges*, Brother-in-Law to the Duke of *Albemarle*, who inſiſted in Parliament on ſeeing public Money fairly accounted for, which raiſed ſuch an Oppoſition as all the Weight of the Crown, all the Intrigues of its Miniſters, and all the Influence of both King and Miniſters, could never conquer. This produced ſuch Reſtrictions as put it out of the Power of the Court, to purſue either foreign or domeſtick Schemes for eſtabliſhing arbitary Power, with any Succeſs; this obliged the King, to live upon pretty good Terms with the *Dutch*, whether he would or not, and defeated his Conjunction with the *French* in ſpight of his Teeth: which put him out of Love with Parliaments, as that raiſed a Spirit of Diſaffection, that ended in the Deſtruction of his Family. Yet this Situation of Affairs as it had ſome ill, ſo it had many good Effects, with Regard to the Nation. On the one Hand,

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he King was reſtrained from acting as he inclined to do, at leaſt during ſome Part of his Reign, in Favour of *France*; and on the other Hand, it kept the Nation from launching too far into Wars upon the Continent, about the Concerns of other People, for which even at that time, there were ſome who had too warm an Inclination. It obliged his Majeſty to great Circumſpection in his Conduct, and perhaps conſtrained him to do many Things that were highly for the Benefit of his Subjects; ſuch as ſending ſtrong Fleets into the *Mediterranean*, and forcing the pyratical States of *Barbary* into Treaties, that have ſecured our Commerce ever ſince. By theſe Methods the publick Revenue was kept within juſt Bounds, and Miniſters were compelled to make up fair Accounts; the Money of the Nation was kept at Home, for except a very few Subſidies during the *Dutch* Wars, we did not feed the Avarice of ſuch Princes as make a Market of their People. It ſecured to us an extenſive and beneficial Trade, and as we had then no great ſtanding Army, no formidable Number of Officers belonging to the Revenue, no publick Debts or Taxes out of the Reach of Parliamentary Inſpection, the Nation grew immenſely rich, as appears from the riſing of the Cuſtoms, for as theſe had been farmed at 400,000*l.* in the Year after the Reſtoration; which in the laſt Year of Queen *Elizabeth* had been let for 36,000*l.* ſo before the Death of King *Charles* II. they aroſe to 800,000*l.* which ſhews how much Trade was improved in ſo little a Time, our Navy was greatly increaſed, and the Tonnage of our trading Ships doubled, according to the Computations of Dr. *Davenant*, who likewiſe ſays that our Coin was encreaſed four Millions and a Half, which ſhews what a mighty Ballance of

Trade

Trade muſt have been all this Time in our Favour; and yet I think I may be juſtified in ſaying that during his whole Reign, there was not one Year with another above a Million and a Half raiſed upon the Nation by Authority of Parliament, and yet, as we have already ſeen, the Affairs of the Continent were not neglected, the Power of *France* was in a good Meaſure reſtrained, and the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, made under King *Charles*'s Mediation, fixed the Tranquility of *Europe*, upon as juſt and laſting a Foundation as any laid for it by future Alliances.

I ſhall not pretend to give any Account of the Politicks of the next Reign, they are but too well known already. King *James* notwithſtanding the Experience he might have reaped, from his Brother's Misfortunes, entered into a cloſe Conjunction with *France*, which, to ſpeak fairly and impartially, was his Ruin. If he did it from religious Views, he certainly ſacrificed his political Intereſts. If his Endeavours to extend his Prerogative to protect and promote Papiſts, to make uſe of corrupt Lawyers, to weaken and decide away the Conſtitution of this Kingdom, which is, and ought to be as much a Rule to the King, as to the Subjects, if I ſay he made the Revolution neceſſary at Home, his Complaiſance for *France* produced the Means of accompliſhing it abroad, not only by engaging *Holland*, but the Emperor, *Spain*, and ſome of the Princes and States of *Germany*, to concur in bringing it about, which they would never have done, let our civil or religious Grievances been what they would, if he had had any juſt Notions of the Ballance of Power in *Europe*. In this Reſpect he was truly infatuated, for he not only diſobliged his natural Allies,

Allies, but even the Pope himſelf, by following the *French* King's Councils: So that it is no wonder, that a Prince who employ'd the ſmall Time he ſat upon the Throne, in driving his Subjects into Diſaffection, and who loſt the Hearts of his Army, by a fooliſh Partiality for *Iriſh* Papiſts, and at the ſame Time compelled the Powers on the Continent, to prefer their own Preſervation to thoſe general Principles of good Neighbourhood, which form the Law of Nations, ſhould loſe his Dominions, and be driven in his old Age to eat the Bread of his Betrayer, and to live an Exile in that Country, to which he had ſacrificed his own. All this was but very natural, and his Brother King *Charles* had foreſeen it, which made him reſolve, if he had lived, to have thrown off all Reſpect for *France*, and to have aimed at recovering the Hearts of his Subjects, and the true Reins of Government, which he had in a Manner loſt by his Miſtakes. But though King *James* was ſo unhappy as not to profit by his Brother's Example, yet we have reaſon to hope that his Fate will be a warning to all future Kings. If had known how to have contented himſelf with a moderate Share of Power, with an ample Revenue, and the reaſonable Obedience of his People; if he had conſulted their Intereſt only; if he, who underſtood Trade, as well as ever Prince did, had cultivated ſuch foreign Alliances as were neceſſary to ſecure it; he might have reigned long and happily over a great and free People, he might have held the Ballance of Power, and he might have given an equitable Law to *Europe*. But this unlucky Prince, in part miſguided by his own Inclinations, in part miſled by the artificial Flatteries of a ſubtle Miniſter, who meant, and who accompliſhed his Ruin, would needs depart

from the ordinary Maxims of Government, deduced from, not to ſay preſcribed by, our Conſtitution, and hoped ſometimes by cloſeting Members, at others by awing them, by diſtributing Places of Power and Profit amongſt his Creatures, by keeping up a large ſtanding Army, and by making all the uſe he could of the Influence of his Revenue to eſtabliſh a new Sort of Government, that he might bring back an old Superſtition; but he found to his Coſt, that an *Engliſh* Monarch, who will not be the King of his People, has Revenues, Armies and Fleets in vain; and that when in his Imagination he is ſtrongeſt, and neareſt his Purpoſe, he is in the greateſt Danger of being nothing at all.

We are now come to that Period of Time, in which we launched out ſuch immenſe Sums for the carrying on a foreign War, I mean after, and in Support of the Revolution; it was juſtly and prudently foreſeen, by ſuch as came then into the Management of Affairs, that to raiſe ſuch Sums as were wanting, by the ordinary Methods, and within the Compaſs of the current Year, was a Thing not practicable, eſpecially conſidering the Eaſe the People had enjoyed under the two laſt Reigns. There was a mighty Difference between raiſing two Millions, and more than Five; and therefore there was no Difficulty in finding out, that ſome Slight was neceſſary to prevent the Peoples feeling it; our Miniſters hit upon that very readily; inſtead of creating Funds ſufficient for the Service of the War, they created Funds for raiſing the Intereſt of ſuch Sums, as might be neceſſary for that Purpoſe, which, beſides the great End of raiſing Money, without the Peoples being ſenſible of it, anſwered many other Ends of almoſt equal Importance. In the

firſt Place it introduced a new Trade, I mean of Stock-Jobbing, in which the Friends of the Government dealt to very great Advantage. It enabled the Miniſtry, by having theſe advantageous Lights in their Power, to draw off Numbers, who would otherwiſe have oppoſed them, by bartering private Advantage in exchange for Publick Spirit. It afforded an Opportunity for augmenting the Officers of the Revenue, for creating a Multitude of new Poſts, and thereby enlarging the Power of the Crown, by means more effectual, and at the ſame Time far leſs invidious, than the old Way of the Prerogative. It likewiſe contributed not a little to the ſtrengthening of the Government; for as the monied Intereſt by degrees came to be deeply engaged, ſo of Conſequence abundance of wealthy People were attached from the Conſideration of their Fortunes, more firmly, than they could have been any other Way, to the new Syſtem. I might proceed to reckon up many more Advantages but theſe are ſufficient to ſhew what the true Motives were, upon which the Government went in eſtabliſhing this Method of raiſing Money, ſo ſtrange to our Conſtitution, and which in a Courſe of Time, has in a Manner new moulded it; and all built upon this ſingle Principle of the Neceſſity of reducing the Power of *France*, and preſerving the Ballance of *Europe*.

To place this perplexed Subject in the cleareſt Light poſſible, it will be proper to obſerve, what the Pretences were for making this extraordinary Change; ſince it would be abſurd to imagine, that if any of the Motives before-mentioned, had been inſiſted on to the Repreſentatives of the People, they would ever have conſented to ſuch a Change, becauſe ſo manifeſtly to the Prejudice of

their Conſtitutents, and becauſe the Weight of Influence was not as yet grown ſtrong enough to introduce ſuch a Change, without plauſible Pretences. In the firſt Place then, it was alledged, that this Method was in reality an Eaſe to the People, ſince it enabled them to carry on a neceſſary War, without levying upon them, immediately, more then they were able to pay. It was in the next Place ſaid, that as the War would be but of a ſhort Continuance, and great Advantages would accrue to the Nation by the Peace, it would be an eaſy Thing to diſcharge the Debts contracted during the War, when the Nation was leaſt able to pay, by larger Impoſitions after the Peace, when by the Increaſe of Trade the People would be in a better Condition to bear them. Now that theſe Principles were miſtaken, if not fallacious, I ſhall make appear in very few Words. Dr. *Davenant* in his Diſcourſes on the publick Revenues and Trade of *England*, obſerves, that the Revenue of the Crown in 1688 was about two Millions. The Houſe of Commons, in an Addreſs to Queen *Anne*, preſented *February* 12, 1702, inform her, that from *November* 5, 1688, to *March* 8, 1701, the Sum of 45,568,725*l.* 19*s.* 2*d.* ½ *qr.* (a Sum never known to be raiſed in very many Reigns before) had been levied on the Subject, and iſſued out of the Exchequer for the Service of the late War, to Paymaſters and Treaſurers. But as it is certain, that a very large Part of this Expence was induced by the Manner of raiſing it, and by the Additions of Premiums and Diſcounts, it may very well be computed, that the whole Expence of the War, might have been carried on by an additional Levy of 4,000,000*l. per Annum*, and ſo the whole Expence on the People raiſed from two

to ſix Millions; and that this might have been very well borne, or at leaſt much more eaſily, than the Method that was taken, appears from hence, that at the Cloſe of the War, Dr. *Davenant*, in the Work before cited, computes the Revenue, than neceſſary, at 5,355,472*l.* upon which he makes the following very judicious Reflection.

It may be here ſaid, that if we pay above Five Millions per Annum, our Condition is not bettered by the Peace; but ſuch as argue this Way do not conſider, that if the War was continued, for Example, this Year, beſides the annual Payment of 3,300,000l. *from the Funds now exiſting, there muſt have been raiſed for the Fleet and Army* 5,000,000l. *in the whole* 8,300,000l. *that is to ſay, there might have been levied, within the Year, about five Millions, and for the Reſt we muſt have run into a new Debt.*

This Obſervation ſtrengthens two of mine to Demonſtrations. For firſt I ſay, that if we were able to raiſe upwards of Five Millions at the cloſe of the War, we muſt have been much better able to have raiſed Six at the Beginning, eſpecially, if it be conſidered, that at the End of the War, we ſhould have been diſcharged of Four, and therefore the Pretence of eaſing the People, was a mere Pretence, invented to cover the ſecret Deſigns of thoſe, who had in View the eſtabliſhing the Power of the Government, that is their own; for the Author of *Faction detected*, tells us plainly, that by Revolution Principles, we are to underſtand a perpetual Whig Adminiſtration. I ſay, Secondly, that the latter Pretence was as ill founded, or to ſpeak more exactly, was as void of Foundation as the former; for it appears, by the foregoing Calculations, which I will venture to

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ſay are the beſt that can be had, that at the End of the War we were obliged to raiſe 5,355,472*l.* and yet had a Debt of between Seventeen and Eighteen Millions, and a Neceſſity upon us, if the War had continued, of raiſing the next Year 8,300,000*l.* Judge then, what Probability there was of paying the Debt contracted in the War, by new Impoſitions, during a Time of Peace; and judge from Experience, I mean by Experience of later Times, how far this Kind of reaſoning was then, or ever will be worthy of Credit. I do not ſay this to diſcredit King *William*'s Government, or to hurt the Reputation of his Miniſters; for if the Syſtem laid down in *Faction Detected*, was the Syſtem they went upon, undoubtedly they acted right, for the Methods they purſued, plainly raiſed, as they have ſince moſt effectually ſupported, that Syſtem. But it is a different Caſe with Reſpect to the Point I am labouring, which is to ſhew the Conſequences that this Change had, with Regard to the Circumſtances of the Inhabitants of theſe Nations; for though I profeſs myſelf to have a due Reſpect for the Whigs, yet (with their Permiſſion) I acknowledge that I have a much deeper Concern for my Country.

But theſe Miſchiefs, however conſiderable, are yet nothing in Reſpect to another, which is but little attended to, and that is the Opportunity, which the Creation of this artificial Wealth affords of running the Nation into a monſtrous Expence, by which private Men may indeed be Gainers, but the Public muſt ſuffer deeply, though ſilently and imperceptibly. For there was this Difference, between the Foreign War carried on after the Revolution, and all the Wars carried on before it, that we never felt a Diſtreſs proportionable

tionable to the Expence it coſt us, and therefore the Bulk of the Nation were not at all ſenſible of the Danger of running into ſuch a War again; and as this Method has been purſued ever ſince, we have gone on increaſing, in all outward appearance, in Trade and Riches, which has given Countenance to the mighty Demands made upon us, for the Support of the Ballance of Power, when in reality we have been in a Condition leaſt able to comply with them; and as this is a Matter of the laſt Importance, as it is indeed the one Thing neceſſary to be underſtood, I hope the Reader will bear with me, if I lay out a large proportion of my own Time, and take up ſome of his, in order thoroughly to explain it.

It is a thing very evident, that the Increaſe and Decreaſe of Coin and Bullion, are the true Signs of a flouriſhing or decaying State of any Nation; and the Reaſon is plainly this, becauſe if the Inhabitants of any Country live within Bounds, their Frugality, with a reaſonable Proportion of Induſtry, muſt neceſſarily draw great Sums of Money into that Country, by various Channels; whereas if any People through Luxury, Idleneſs, or foreign Wars run into ſuch Expences, as they cannot afford, the Conſequence muſt be, that as a Nation they will grow poor, of which the Scarcity of Coin and Bullion will be a certain Mark. This happened frequently in former Reigns, and forced our Princes upon ſtrange Expedients: King *Henry* III. granted Letters Patent to the Archbiſhop of *York*, to impower him to pawn his Jewels; and the great *Edward* I. granted the like Letters Patent to *Giles Andover*. *Edward* III. pawned his Jewels to pay certain Foreign Mercenaries their Wages, as appears by the cloſe Rolls, in the Tower, of the

the firſt Year of his Reign ; and *Walſingham* the Hiſtorian, tells us, that *Edward* the Black Prince was forced to coin his Plate to pay his Troops. But what is ſtill more extraordinary, *Edward* III. pawned the Imperial Crown of this Realm three Times, as *Henry* V. did once ; and that we may not imagine theſe are old Stories, and do not concern us, I muſt take Notice that Queen *Elizabeth*, in the latter Part of her Reign, taking into her princely Conſideration, the great Inconveniency that muſt ariſe from demanding more Money of her Subjects than they could well ſpare, choſe rather to raiſe Money upon the Crown Jewels, in order to defray the great Expences ſhe was at in Parts beyond the Seas. I cite theſe as ſo many Caſes in Point, to ſhew that foreign Wars, and foreign Negotiations have heretofore reduced us into very diſtreſſed Circumſtances, ſince I think it muſt be taken for granted that the People could do no more, when their Princes were obliged to do ſo much.

When therefore it was thought requiſite to enter ſo warmly into the Affairs of the Continent, as we did after the Revolution, it was eaſily foreſeen, that any Diſtreſs of this Kind would be attended with untoward Conſequences, and oblige the Nation to conſider the Importance of the War in another Light, than it was thought fit for them to ſee it; therefore to ſolve this Difficulty, our *Dutch* Privy-Counſellors introduced a Method, which had been before practiſed in their Country, and this was creating a Paper-Credit, or rather a Paper-Currency, by which all the uſes of Caſh were ſo well anſwered here at Home, that it became an eaſy Matter, to tranſport large Sums abroad, without our feeling the Inconveniencies immediately; and as Practice has rendered this

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more familiar, ſo we now ſee that Paper-Currency manages the Trade of the greateſt Part of this Iſland; from whence I know our Politicians imagine we receive mighty Benefits, but which at the ſame Time, in my Opinion, is attended with ſome few Inconveniences; for this reaſon, becauſe if it were otherwiſe, the Mode of Reaſoning uſed by theſe Politicians would prove too much, ſince in the Manner they put it, the more we run in Debt the richer we muſt be. In Order to remove the Obſcurity under which this Subject labours, let us conſider,

That our Debts and our Paper will not pay foreign Troops, or even our own in foreign Countries; in order to that there muſt be real Wealth employ'd, that is ſuch Wealth as hath an intrinſic Value in all Countries; whence it appears, that thoſe Things which paſs for the Equivalents with Money at Home, are mere Paper abroad; ſo that however we may amuſe *each other, we* muſt pay *Foreigners. As long therefore as our Situation engages us either in expenſive Wars, or expenſive Negotiations, it follows, that there will be a great Drain upon us for Money, but no Call on that ſide for our Paper. In order to ſupply this, what do we do? Do we bring in large Quantities of Gold and Silver, that is impoſſible, Trade only can ſupply that, and Trade always ſuffers in Time of actual War, or fluctuating Peace. But what do we do, why we contract freſh Debts, by Means of which an additional Quantity of Paper-Money comes to be circulated, which enables us to part with Gold and Silver, without its being immediately miſſed. On the whole therefore, the Evil which our Anceſtors ſuffered by Foreign Wars, is not removed but palliated; the Burthen upon us is as great as ever, we have only erected a Column, upon which while we pitch it,*

we do not immediately feel it. But this is not all, let us reflect alſo,

That the only Way by which one Nation can gain by another, is by bringing that other into ſuch a Situation as to oblige her to export her Coin and Bullion to you without Reſource, by which I mean, for I would have my Readers underſtand what I mean, as well as what I ſay, in ſuch a Manner, as that the Nation, ſo exporting her Coin, may have no demand for it again, in any Shape whatever. In Order to make this clear, I muſt have Recourſe to Facts. A little after the Reſtoration, ſuch as looked cloſely into the Commercial Concerns of this Nation, came to be of Opinion that we carried on too great a Trade with France, *notwithſtanding this Trade was then carried on entirely in our own Bottoms. The Reaſon was, becauſe we took too great a Quantity of* French *Commodities, and paid the Ballance in Coin or Bullion; and therefore it was thought neceſſary to put a Stop to a Trade which drained us of our Money, and ſerved only to enrich our too powerful Neighbour. But the* Dutch, *who in Matters of this Nature, are without Diſpute, the wiſeſt People in* Europe, *carry on a loſing Trade with us, and that to a much higher Degree than ours ever was with* France, *and yet they never thought fit to put a ſtop to it, for this plain Reaſon, becauſe notwithſtanding they pay us a large Ballance in Money, they export the Commodities they take from us, and by that Means repay themſelves with Intereſt. Theſe two Inſtances fully explain what is meant by exporting Coin and Bullion, and exporting it without Reſource. I proceed therefore to the laſt Conſideration, which is,*

That by whatever Method a Neceſſity is created of exporting Money or Bullion out of any Country without Reſource, is in the Nature of a loſing Trade; ſo that conſequently if a Stop be not put to it, the Nation

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ſubject to ſuch Drains, muſt certainly and ſpeedily be undone. For as it is impoſſible to diſtinguiſh the Crown-Piece ſpent by a Soldier, from the Crown-Piece ſpent by a Merchant, ſo it is ſimply impoſſible to make any Diſtinction between the Money carried abroad, by our having the Ballance of Trade againſt us, and the Money ſent abroad to pay or to ſupport foreign Troops, or even to pay or to ſupport our own. I ſay between theſe there is abſolutely no Diſtinction but One, and that is, we can with much greater Eaſe and Certainty put a Stop to the latter, than we can to the former. If therefore a Nation is undone by this, it muſt be through their own Fault, or that of their Governors, though they may be grievouſly diſtreſſed by that, without any great Failing either in themſelves, or their Rulers. For though War be an Evil, and a very great Evil in a trading Country, yet there are Nations, who either from the Bent of their Genius, their Circumſtances and Situation, or from their Want of all other Trade, make a Trade of this. It is apparent therefore, that with Reſpect to theſe Nations, the Time of War, or at leaſt the Time of Confuſion is actually more agreeable, becauſe more beneficial than a Time of ſettled Peace and Tranquility. It follows, that it can never be the Intereſt of any of their Neighbour to feed or promote this Humour, becauſe while it turns to the Benefit of theſe Dealers in War, it muſt prove the Deſtruction of ſuch as live in another Way, and procure the Means of living by other and better Methods.

To vindicate the Truth of my Aſſertions, I might Inſtance the Republick of *Sparta* amongſt the Ancients, and the Canton of *Berne* among the Moderns. The former by declining all other Trades but that of War, drew to themſelves the beſt Part of the Gold and Silver in *Greece*; and if they had not opened a Paſſage for it by diſpen-

ſing with the Laws of *Lycurgus*, and departing from their Frugality and martial Meaſures, they muſt have engroſſed the Power and the Money of that Part of the World, and have preſcribed ſuch Terms to their Neighbours, as would have ſerved their Purpoſe beſt. As to the Canton of *Berne*, they are at this Hour poſſeſſed of a prodigious Treaſure, amaſſed by letting out their Subjects to foreign Princes, and though it ſerves them only for a Reſource in Time of Need, yet it may ſo far ſerve us, as it ſhews the Conſequence of furniſhing a Nation with Money, from whom there is no getting it again.

Theſe Things being premiſed, the Reader will very eaſily conceive, how War comes to be ſtrictly ſpeaking, what I have called it, a Trade in *Germany*. I do not mean by a Trade, ſimply a Mode of Gain to the Princes who let out their Men for Hire, but a much higher Kind of Trade, a Sort of Commerce, beneficial to the whole Country. For, whatever other People may imagine, I lay it down as a Thing abſolutely certain, that the *Germans* are by much the moſt able Politicians amongſt the Moderns. The *Italians* indeed are in ſome Meaſure in Poſſeſſion of that Reputation; but whoever conſiders that except *Venice* and perhaps *Savoy*, there is not an an independant State in *Italy*, and at the ſame Time reflects that *Great-Britain*, *Sweden*, *Denmark*, and *Tuſcany*, are all governed by *German* Princes, and that the Imperial Prince of *Ruſſia* is a *German* likewiſe, will not think me altogether in the wrong. And this Power of their Princes, has been the Effect of their new Policy, built altogether upon this Maxim, that War by proper Management may be made a Trade. When heretofore the *Hans* Towns flouriſhed in that Country,

Country, they contrived to monopolize Trade; and were ſo ſucceſsful in their Contrivances, that no Country could carry on any Trade, without their running away with the beſt Part of the Profit; the Scene is now changed, moſt of thoſe great Cities have been ſwallowed up by the Ambition of the Princes in their Neighbourhood; and it is a Wonder that both Princes and Cities were not ſwallowed up by the Ambition of *Charles* V. With his Family they ſtruggled for a Time with great Difficulty, but ſince then they have not only ſtruck out this new Trade of War, but found a Way to make other Nations maintain it. Since the Treaty of *Munſter*, all the Wars in *Germany* have been fed by foreign Money. The Houſe of *Auſtria* was ſupported by the Riches of *Spain*; and ſuch as oppoſed the Houſe of *Auſtria*, by the Wealth of *France*; and in the laſt general War, when the Houſe of *Auſtria* had no longer *Spain* to ſupport her, that Deficiency was amply ſupplied by us, and by the *Dutch*; ſo that notwithſtanding Multitudes of private Perſons might be beggared, and particular Provinces might be ruined, that is for a Time, yet *Germany*, or to ſpeak with greater Propriety, the *German* Nation, muſt have been very conſiderable Gainers, by the immenſe Sums of Money poured into their Country by the War.

But to come cloſer to the Point, let us conſider what *Germany* got by the long Train of Negotiations which ſuceeded the Treaties of *Utrecht* and *Baden*. In the firſt Place, the late Emperor drew immenſe Sums from *Italy*, and the Noblemen he ſent thither as Vice-roys, Governors, and Generals, returned home again with vaſt Eſtates. Yet he bore very little Part of the Expence of that War, ſupported by the Quadruple Alliance. It

appears,

appears by Sir *George Byng*'s Expedition to *Sicily*, that it coſt us more, than it did him, to conquer that Kingdom; and every Body knows into what Condition both *Sicilies* fell, after that they had been but a few Years in the hands of the *Germans*. Before and after that Time, We and the *Dutch* paid very large Subſidies to many of the *German* Princes, for Troops we had no Occaſion to employ, ſo that the whole of thoſe Subſidies were clear Gains to the *Germans*. When *Italy* was drained, and the Maritime Powers did not part from their Coin quite ſo freely, the Emperor clapt up a Treaty with *Spain*, which as uſual was maintained by prodigious Subſidies from that Crown, and ſubſiſted in full Force, as long as *Spain* found Money to pay them; which made it abſolutely neceſſary for the *Hanover* Allies to open their Purſes alſo, and to ſend Millions of Florins, in hard Money, into *Germany*; and this too whilſt the *Oſtend* Company was running away with their Trade, the only Means by which they were enabled to bear ſuch Expences. At laſt, indeed a War broke out, that was extremely fatal to the Houſe of *Auſtria*. But why? Becauſe the Maritime Powers took no Share therein; which ſhews that it is they ſupport the Expence of general Wars, upon what Principle ſoever they are drawn into them.

To ſum up all, that is neceſſary to be ſaid, on this Occaſion, let us conſider what Sums of Money have rolled, from all Sides, into *Germany*, ſince the Opening of the preſent War. The *French* make no Scruple of owning, that the very Preparations requiſite thereto, I mean the Subſidies granted to the Emperor, and other *German* Princes, and the Money furniſhed for Magazines, Forage, and other Neceſſaries before their Troops

entered

entered *Germany*, amounted to 5,000,000*l.* Sterling: And yet the late Cardinal *de Fleury* is accuſed of ſtarving the Cauſe, notwithſtanding theſe prodigious Remittances. After this the *French* maintained an Army of upwards of 100,000 Men for two Years, which cannot be computed at leſs than 9,000,000*l.* Sterling. But to prevent any Diſputes about this Computation, I am content to throw in all that was ſpent and loſt in Fortifications, Artillery, Military Stores, Baggage, Ranſoms, *&c.* and take the whole at 15,000,000*l.* including alſo the Subſidies, that were all along paid to the Allies of *France*. To this we are to add, all that it has coſt us, the *Dutch*, and the Czarina, which I preſume will not be thought over calculated at 5,000,000*l.* and then we ſee what an immenſe Quantity of Silver and Gold muſt in the Space of a very few Years have travelled into that Country, from whence I think all the World agrees not a ſingle Shilling is ever like to return. If therefore we reflect upon the Certainty of all this, ſince I preſume nobody imagines that the *Germans* will ſell their Country and their Blood for Promiſes or Paper, and at the ſame Time conſiders how many Years are required to bring in ſuch a Sum of ready Money into any Country by the Ballance of Trade, we ſhall be thoroughly ſatisfied, that this kind of Militia Commerce is a very compendious Method of collecting Riches; and as the Power of *Germany* is likewiſe encreaſed by it, as their Army grows daily more numerous and better diſciplined, it may afford ſome future Proſpects, which deſerve the ſerious Attention of our Politicians; by which I mean ſuch Politicians, as ſtudy ours, and not the *German* Intereſt.

It may be ſaid, and very probable it will be ſaid, that a private Man, who has no other Lights than thoſe afforded him by his Studies, cannot be ſo proper a Judge of theſe Matters, as our Stateſmen, who may be preſumed to have greater Abilities, and who have moſt certainly more favourable Opportunities of improving them; but to this I anſwer, that as we are not at preſent famous for conſtantly preferring Merit, the Height of a Man's Station ought not to be eſteemed the Standard of his Abilities; and on the other Hand, as there have been ſometimes great Men who were no Politicians, ſo perhaps there is no Abſurdity in ſaying, that a Man may be a Politician, though he is not great. Policy like all other Sciences is founded upon Principles, ſelf-evident in themſelves, and from which good Senſe alone will enable a Man of tolerable Experience to make Deductions; and I preſume to ſay further, that what I have delivered is not only founded on Reaſon, but is exactly agreeable to Experience; for while we have been either Fighting or Negotiating away our Money, and thereby enriching our Neighbours, the Nation has been growing gradually poorer; for had it been otherwiſe, we ſhould have leſſened, whereas it is but too certain that we have rather increaſed our Debts. Our Trade may poſſibly ſupport us, and even pay the Intereſt of theſe Debts, 'till we fall into ſome Method or other of diſcharging them, which muſt be done by leſſening our publick Expences; but if inſtead of doing this, which Reaſon and the invariable Maxims of true Policy point out to us, we ſuffer ourſelves to be talked into the oppoſite Method by warm Stateſmen. There can be nothing more apparent, than that as Queen *Anne*'s War, added to the Debt of King *William*'s, ſo the preſent

ſent War, eſpecially in its preſent Management, will add to the heavy Load that was left upon us by the laſt; and what the Conſequence of this muſt be, requires no mighty Foreſight. We begin already to talk of reducing the Intereſt of the Funds, which is at the Bottom reducing the Principal; and if we compute the Number of Years between thoſe Reductions, it is pretty much the ſame Thing, as if our Publick Funds, like our Land Eſtates were ſubject to Taxes; for if both are diminiſhed in the ſame Time, and pretty nearly in the ſame Proportion, it matters not much whether theſe Diminutions do, or do not go under different Names, ſince it comes to the ſame Thing at laſt; and private Men find their Properties as effectually leſſened one way as the other. All this is, or I have thrown away a great deal of Pains, perfectly plain and clear; and I hope will not be thought the leſs certain, or leſs worthy of Notice, for being ſo.

It will be neceſſary however in order to render this Treatiſe more uſeful and fitter to anſwer the End for which it was written, to apply the principal Points laid down therein to the preſent Situation of Affairs; for this I think not only expedient at this Time, but very allowable; by which I mean that it is not only agreeable to the Intereſt of the Nation, but ought to be ſo likewiſe to ſuch as have the Direction of publick Affairs, ſince nothing can import them more, than that Truth, in ſuch Matters as theſe, ſhould be rendered ſo manifeſt, as not to admit either of Doubt or Evaſion. A late Author, who is ſuppoſed to be much in Favour with the Great, and to be withal pretty deep in the Secret of their Meaſures, has taken no ſmall Pains to perſuade his Country-Men, that the ſingle Rule of their

Conduct, ſhould be an Oppoſition to *France*; ſo that provided they conſtantly croſs the Deſigns of that Power, they need never regard what Steps they take, or what Sums the taking thoſe Steps may coſt them. This I muſt confeſs ſeems to be very extraordinary Doctrine, and at the ſame Time ſuch as deſerves very ſerious Conſideration; for if this be our true Intereſt, it is ſuch a one as never Nation had before, and ſuch as no other Nation now profeſſes but ourſelves. Yet as extraordinary as it is, I do not think it ought to be condemned without Examination, or a contrary Conduct recommended without Reaſons given for its Support, which is what I have attempted in the foregoing Pages; wherein, I preſume to ſay, that I have made it clear from Reaſon and Experience, from all the Principles of Policy, and all the Lights of Hiſtory, that the following Points are certain and indiſputable Truths, *viz.*

That the Germans, *conſidered as a Nation, have been always extremely attached to their own Intereſts, and have conſtantly ſacrificed to it whatever Engagements they have entered into with Strangers, upon this Principle, that the Good of their own Country, was the Fundamental Principle of true Politicks, as Self-Preſervation is ſaid to be of the Law of Nature; and this is laid down, not with any View of leſſening or diſparaging thoſe of whom it is ſaid, but on the contrary, to eſtabliſh ſo wiſe and juſt a Maxim, from the Authority of ſo regarded a People. If we are to admire and value the* Germans *for other Things, ſurely we ought not to paſs by that Quality, which is moſt conſpicuous in their Conduct; I mean their Patriotiſm, their ſtrict, inviolable and moſt laudable Attachment to their own Country, at the Expence of all others; which though ſome deſigning Politicians*

may

may repreſent it as a narrow Bottom, is notwithſtanding the only Bottom upon which true rational and invariable Policy can be founded. For as Self-Intereſt and Social, when ſtrictly conſidered, are found to be the ſame, ſo if the Inhabitants of every Country would mind their own Intereſts, it is plain the Intereſt of the whole would be purſued; Providence having ſo ordered it, that each State looking to its own Concerns, ſhall produce not only Good to itſelf, but to its Neighbours; and therefore to quit this Principle is to quit our own Buſineſs, and entrench upon God Almighty's.

That the Inhabitants of Germany, *have wiſely, honeſtly, and virtuouſly preferred their Liberty and Independancy to all other Conſiderations; and for this Reaſon called in the Aſſiſtance of* French, Swedes, Danes, *and other Nations, in order to prevent their Freedom from being deſtroyed by the Ambition of the Houſe of* Auſtria. *This Conduct of the Princes and States of* Germany, *brought about the Treaties of* Weſtphalia, *by which the Conſtitution of the Empire is ſettled, and the Ballance of Power therein legally and effectually ſecured. From hence it has followed, that whatever our great Miniſters might believe, or rather might endeavour to make this Nation believe, the* Germans *in general have always conſidered ſuch Powers, as have ſupported the Authority of the Houſe of* Auſtria, *as miſtaking the true Intereſt of* Germany; *and inadvertently contributing to the altering that Ballance, which it was their own Intereſt, as well as the Intereſt of the* Germans, *to protect and preſerve; becauſe it is the Freedom of this Nation that makes it formidable to the* French, *and uſeful to its Allies. All which ſhews the Neceſſity of our diſtinguiſhing rightly as to the Ballance of* Germany, *if we mean in earneſt to ſecure the Ballance of* Europe; *and from the Want of Care in this Particular, it has*

been that our Confederacies have ſo indifferently ſucceeded; notwithſtanding, that we had in Reality, as well as in Appearance, a Power on our ſide infinitely ſuperior to that of France, *if we had known how to uſe it, or rather how to judge rightly, of our own Intereſt, and thoſe of the* Germans.

That we have been abſolutely miſtaken in attributing one while to the Weakneſs of the German *Princes, at another Time to their Wickedneſs and Perfidy, their not cruſhing the* French *in the two laſt general Wars; when in Reality they failed of Succeſs, not through Want of Power, but Want of Will. They did not Fancy, as ſome People on this Side of the Water did, or at leaſt pretended ſo to do, that their Intereſts were Diametrical Oppoſite to thoſe of* France; *but they judged it requiſite to leave ſuch a Strength in that Power, as might for ever ſecure to them the Advantages, which by the Aſſiſtance of that Power, they had gained by the Treaty of* Weſtphalia. *This ſecret Inclination for* France, *which we were pleaſed to call by the infamous Name of Treachery, appeared to them in the Light of Patriotiſm; for they wiſely diſtinguiſhed between a blind Fondneſs for their Country, and a Rational Concern for their being Free in that Country. They hated the* French *heartily, ſo long as they had Reaſon to fear them, but they loved themſelves too well to ſuffer this Paſſion ſo far to get the better of their Underſtandings, as by undoing* France, *to leave it in the Power of the then Imperial Family, to undo themſelves. Theſe were then, theſe ever will be the Principles of their Conduct, and if we have not Penetration enough to ſee it, or Senſe enough to regulate our Conduct thereby, this will not alter their Schemes, though it may perhaps ruin us.*

That the preſent War in Germany *is a freſh Proof of the Truth of theſe Maxims, and is ſo far from proving*

ving that the German Princes either are, or believe themſelves, inferior to the Power of France, that it proves the direct contrary; for it is certain, that if they had imagined, the whole Power of the French Monarchy in any Degree equal to, much leſs far greater than, their own, they would never have ſuffered ſuch mighty Armies to have entered their Country quietly. But it is plain they acted from quite another Motive, they made uſe of the French Power, to pull down that of which they were equally afraid, not doubting but when this was done, that they would have been able to have kept the French within proper Bounds; which from the foregoing Computation of the preſent Strength of Germany, and even from the Conſequences of this War, calamitous as they are, I think it plainly appears they were. I do not pretend to ſay, that what the German Confederates did was juſt or right, but be that as it will, plain it is, that they were not at all miſtaken; and that if France had carried her Point in Germany, ſhe would rather have gratified her Pique to the Houſe of Auſtria than have provided for her own Security; ſince deſtroying the Ballance of Power in Germany will be found whenever ſhe comes to underſtand it rightly, to be no more her Intereſt than it is ours, upon which Foot alone the publick Tranquility muſt be again eſtabliſhed.

That the preſent Situation of Things in Germany, is not ſo much the Effect of French Power, or French Intrigues, as of the Inclinations or rather Policy of the Princes and States of Germany, the Houſe of Auſtria only excepted. Hence this Unanimity in electing the preſent Emperor, and their Zeal and Conſtancy in ſupporting him, though ſtript of his hereditary Dominions. If we conſider the Thing in a different Light, that has no Manner of Effect on them; for if it had, the Diet would certainly have declared againſt France, after the Battle of Dettingen, when there

there was nothing wanting, but ſuch a Declaration to have carried the War into the Heart of France. *This enables us to make Senſe of Colonel* Mentzel's *Declaration, and to account for the Inactivity of the Campaign, after ſo extraordinary a Piece. That Declaration was undoubtedly made, with a View to feel the Pulſe of the Diet, and if that had beat high, the moſt vigorous Meaſures would certainly have been purſued; but as it did not, it became expedient, to ſay the Truth, it became neceſſary, to temporiſe, 'till a new Plan could be formed. But ſurely after having puſhed Matters ſo far, as to be thoroughly convinced that we have neither Power enough to force, or Policy enough to perſuade the* Germanick *Body, that all Things are to be ſacrificed to the gratifying our Hatred or Fear of* France, *we ought in Time to turn our Thoughts homeward, in Order to take Care of our own Concerns.*

Upon doing this, it plainly appears, from the ſame Lights of Reaſon and Experience,

That foreign Wars have been equally fatal to Engliſh *Princes, and to the* Engliſh *Nation, and that however they may at ſome times contribute to raiſe the Reputation of either, they have in the End weakned the Power and deſtroyed the Happineſs of both. This has been rendered clear from the Hiſtory of various Reigns, ſhewn to be the Senſe of our Kings, from their private Letters and publick Declarations, and proved to be the Sentiments of our Anceſtors from the moſt authentick Records. On the other Hand, it has been as fully demonſtrated, that a contrary Conduct has been the Source of the Wealth, Trade, and Influence of theſe Kingdoms, in the ſeveral Reigns which make the moſt ſhining Figures in our Chronicles, ſo that if we will either truſt to the Opinions of our Anceſtors, to the Evidence ariſing from Experience of paſt Times, or to our own Reaſon, we muſt be*

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convinced, that Peace and a ſteady Regard to our own Intereſt, are the only Means by which our Liberties can be ſecured, our Trade extended, and our Authority, with Reſpect to our neareſt Neighbours in particular, and all Europe in general, effectually eſtabliſhed, and for ever maintained.

That whenever we have been drawn to depart from theſe Maxims, to gratify the Ambition of our Kings, or the Notions of our Miniſters, we have been driven back to them by a Series of Misfortunes, which might have been eaſily foreſeen, and of Conſequence without Difficulty avoided. For in the Proſecution of ſuch Views we have been made continually the Tools of others, not only without the leaſt viſible Advantage, but even to the manifeſt Prejudice of ourſelves. This we have from Time to Time acknowledged, though we have as frequently relapſed, and upon every Relapſe have been forced to recur to right Meaſures, by finding ourſelves deceived in our Expectations, exhauſted of our Treaſure, and deſerted by thoſe for whom we were ſo unreaſonably prodigal. Neither has this been our Caſe only, but the Caſe of every other Nation poſſeſſed with a Romantic Zeal for ſettling the Rights of Mankind, and of interfering with the Prerogative of Providence; which was ſo clear to that great and honeſt Stateſman John de Witt, that he wiſely laid it down, in his Maxims for the Conduct of the States of Holland, that this was a Point always to be avoided; nor does it appear at this Day that his Countrymen have forgot his Advice, which I ſpeak to their Honour, as well as for the Inſtruction of ourſelves.

That through theſe repeated Miſtakes, we are at laſt fallen into ſuch a Condition, that nothing but a ſettled Reſolution of opening our Eyes at laſt, and of keeping them open, can ſave us from Ruin. Our Taxes are ſo high, that, according to the moſt moderate Computation, they amount to upwards of thirteen Shillings

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in the Pound; which adds ſuch an artificial Weight to the intrinſic Value of our Manufactures, as puts it in the Power of ſome of our Neighbours, particularly the Dutch *and* French, *to underſell us, and out of the Power of moſt Foreign Nations to purchaſe them, if we were not underſold; ſuch is the Caſe with reſpect to our Trade abroad. But in Regard to our Conduct at Home, Things are ſtill in a much worſe State. For on one Hand, our vaſt public Debt may be juſtly conſidered as a Fund for Idleneſs and Luxury, and an unnatural Method of making imaginary Wealth produce real Intereſt to the Deſtruction of private Credit, by which Means it becomes a dead Weight on Trade, while, on the other Hand, the Money raiſed for the Intereſt of this Debt is drawn from the Lands and Manufactures of this Kingdom; ſo that by the moſt prepoſterous Policy, that was ever introduced in any Nation, the Induſtrious are taxed to ſupport the Idle, and thoſe who labour hardeſt to get their Bread, are obliged to part with one third of that Bread, to ſuch as will do nothing.*

That as theſe Hardſhips would be grievous on any Nation, ſo in any trading Nation they are intollerable; ſince they light the Candle at both Ends, and conſume us as faſt as our bittereſt Enemies can wiſh. For while they load our foreign Trade, they abate our domeſtick Induſtry, and as they prevent our getting Money if we could earn it, ſo they hinder us from earning it, if we could get it; the Proof of theſe Facts is obvious in the Progreſs made by foreign Nations, beating us out of our Trade, which they never could have done, if the Price of our Goods had not been raiſed through the Increaſe and Multiplicity of our Taxes; at the ſame Time, that through the Loſs of Induſtry, and the mighty Progreſs of Luxury, our Manners have been moſt amazingly corrupted, and this Corruption has rendered it poſſible to keep us for many Years, in

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this untoward Situation, and muſt ſtill keep us ſo, if there is not ſuch a Portion of publick Spirit left amongſt us, as being properly, I mean legally directed, may enable us to ſhake it off, and reſume our old Virtues, together with the ſteady Purſuit of our own Intereſts.

That all Things conſidered, this Task, however arduous, muſt be undertaken, and that ſpeedily, if we will eſcape final Deſtruction is certain; ſince it is evident, that we are already in ſuch Circumſtances, as to have Advocates for the public Debt, by which I mean raiſing Money by mortgaging the Credit of the Nation, equal in Strength to the Landed Intereſt; and by the Concurrence of Accidents, ſometimes ſuperior to them, as appeared in the defeating Sir John Barnard's *three* per Cent. *Scheme. Becauſe it is viſible, that if we proceed in remitting abroad on any Pretence whatſoever, a larger Proportion of Wealth than is brought in by the Ballance of Trade, we muſt neceſſarily beggar ourſelves to enrich and ſupport our Allies. Becauſe we are drawn into this from a fallacious Appearance of Riches, which ariſes from the very Strength of Paper Credit, and which will be found fallacious only, if we continue to export our Caſh and Bullion, the Continuance of which amongſt us is the ſole Means of ſupporting it; becauſe the Truth and Certainty of all that has been ſaid may be put out of doubt, by conſidering this undeniable Fact, that at a Time when Rents are every where falling, the Poors Rate every where increaſing, and the Cuſtoms daily diminiſhing, a Handful of* Jews, *who never employ'd five Hands at Home, in any other Way than adminiſtering to our Luxury, and who never exported any Thing abroad, except perhaps our Coin, are able to lend the Public Millions,——If this is not a Demonſtration that Induſtry and Trade are ſinking, and that nothing can ſave us, but a timely Inter-*

poſition of Frugality and Publick Spirit, I think Sceptiſm ought to take Place of Reaſon in Politicks, as it has already done of Authority in Religion.

I have now performed all I promiſed, and ſupplied the candid and impartial Reader, to the beſt of my power, with all the Lights, that are neceſſary, to enable him to judge ſenſibly of the preſent State of Affairs, of the Conduct hitherto purſued, the Conduct we ſhould have purſued, and the Conduct we ought ſtill to purſue, for our own Benefit, and the Security of our Neighbours. I have laid down nothing without aſſigning Reaſons, and ſupporting thoſe Reaſons by the Evidence of Facts; and I have at the ſame Time avoided, with the utmoſt Care, whatever might ſeem to carry the leaſt Appearance of Perſonal Reflection. In handling this Subject, and in handling it in this Manner, I have had the Satisfaction of that Part of my Countrymen in view, who have no other Expectations from the purſuit of political Meaſures, but what muſt follow from the Rectitude of thoſe Meaſures; for I knew well enough, before I ſet Pen to Paper, that ſuch as have an Intereſt in carrying on a tedious and uncertain War upon the Continent, were never to be ſatisfied, that is, ſo long as they are in their preſent Situation, for it is idle to argue againſt Intereſt; he who is thoroughly poſſeſſed with it ſhuts his Ears to Reaſon.

But however theſe Men may diſlike, and declaim againſt this Work at preſent; I am pretty confident, that when by a purſuit of their own Meaſures, if they are permitted to purſue them, their Situations are changed, and they come to be poſſeſſed of large Properties, they will then alter their Sentiments, reject their former Plan, and eſpouſe mine. This being a Fact, I can only render

render it probable by ſhewing that I have Experience on my Side. Many of thoſe who eſpouſed the Cauſe of War vigorouſly in the Days of Quen *Anne*, and in the Beginning of the late Reign ſhewed, or pretended to ſhew, the utmoſt Zeal for hanging up thoſe who brought about a Peace, became afterwards, when ſuch a Change as I before mentioned had happened in their own Circumſtances, as warm Advocates for pacifick Meaſures. I do not ſay this with any View of blaming them for this Change in their Conduct, for let Men have gone Wrong ever ſo long, it is always laudable for them to go right at laſt; and if to their Care of preſerving Peace they had joined an aſſiduous Application to the promoting Trade, reducing the publick Debt, and leſſening our Taxes, they had moſt certainly prevented the preſent Diſputes; for it is an unqueſtionable Truth, and they have themſelves owned it, that nothing but the embarraſſed State of *Great-Britain*, could encourage *France* to reſume her ambitious Deſigns, or inſpire her with any probable Hopes of carrying them into Execution.

If therefore this be true, and there be generally ſpeaking ſuch a Repugnancy between the Intereſts of *Great Britain* and the Intereſt of *France*, while this Thirſt of Dominion governs her Councils, it is plain, that to ſecure ourſelves, and to thwart them, the only Method left in our power, is to act with the greateſt Oeconomy at Home, and to avoid entering into ſuch Meaſures abroad, as muſt oblige us to be at ſuch an Expence, as will neceſſarily ſubject us, not only to our preſent Load of Debts and Taxes, but to a much greater. If it ſhould be objected that the preſent apparent Wealth of this Nation, our great Plenty of Plate Jewels, and other valuable Effects, and the

great Quantity of Specie that circulates ſeems to ſhew that there is no Weight in theſe Arguments, and that we are ſtill in a Condition to carry on our Share of a general War, without any Danger of Ruin, I muſt beg leave to offer the following Particulars to the Conſideration of ſuch as believe there is any Weight in this Objection. That this is a Matter not capable of the neceſſary Proof, I mean ſuch a Proof as is requiſite to ſupport the Objection; for Wealth in particular Hands, or Wealth in particular Places, is no certain Sign of the general Riches of a Country, but rather the contrary; and I deſire that every ſenſible Man would examine, and reflect, whether Plate, Jewels, and valuable Effects, are more conſpicuous in the Houſes of Traders, Manufacturers Farmers, and ſuch like induſtrious People, who cannot enrich themſelves, without enriching the Nation, or whether they are in the Hands of another Sort of People, who may, who indeed muſt grow rich, by the Purſuit of Meaſures beneficial to themſelves, however deſtructive to the Nation. That all this Shew of Wealth depends intirely upon our publick Credit, while that ſubſiſts we muſt preſerve it, if that ſhould fail this muſt vaniſh. A Man deeply in Debt, may have his Houſe richly furniſhed, but if his Creditors fall upon him, he who had yeſterday a Cupboard of Plate, may to-morrow want an Earthen Cup for his Small-Beer. That it is not impoſſible our very Specie may be owing to our publick Debts, for while all *Europe* is in Confuſion, while we are raiſing Money upon Intereſt, and the publick Faith of this Nation is regarded (as I hope it ever will) as an indubitable Security, it is highly probable that our Neighbours, while they are poſſeſſed of any Money, will ſend it over hither, in order

order to make the moſt of it, and at the ſame Time have it in a Place of Security, which will at once account for the keeping up of our Stocks, notwithſtanding our entering into a War, and our finding Money for the Maintenance of that War, though from the Want of a Ballance of Trade in our Favour, we might be otherwiſe incapable of ſupplying it. But what will all this end in? If we ſhould be preſs'd for our Debts, is it poſſible for us to pay them, when we cannot raiſe Money for the Service of the current Year, without running many Millions in Debt? If on the other Hand, the publick Creditors ſhould be contented with receiving only the Intereſt of their Debts, as they ſtand at preſent, muſt this Country be for ever mortgaged, muſt ourſelves, and our Poſterity, live not only without Eaſe, but withour Hope? Let theſe Particulars I ſay be conſidered, and then let the Objection have all the Weight that it deſerves. I do not labour to eſtabliſh a Syſtem, but to come at the Truth.

It is with the ſame View to Truth, that I incline to conſider this Point in another Light, that is, on a Suppoſition that the Fact on which the Objection is grounded may be true. I will ſuppoſe, agreeable thereto, that Plate, Jewels, Pictures, Furniture, and whatever elſe a Spirit of Luxury requires for its Gratification, abound amongſt us more at preſent, than in any other Period of Time; nay, I will go ſtill further, and ſuppoſe, as ſuch as make the Objection do, that in Point of Manufactures, Shipping and Trade, we are in a Condition much ſuperior to our Anceſtors. Yet what of all this? If we are truly rich, we act as if we were miſerably poor, and if we continue to do ſo, we muſt become really poor. We have for thirty Years laſt paſt, raiſed as much upon

the People, to pay the Intereſt of the publick Debt, as if properly applied would have defrayed the current Service of the Year. Let any honeſt ſenſible Man lay his Hand upon his Heart, and ſay whether it is wiſe and honeſt to raiſe upon the People juſt as much again as there is any Occaſion for. If we are really rich, why are we in Debt? Whoſe Intereſt is it to keep us in this Situation, to anticipate our Funds, and to apply that to the Payment of Intereſt, which if raiſed in a proper Time, and appropriated to proper Purpoſes, would have kept us from paying Intereſt at all? If we are really poor, ſo poor as that it is neceſſary for us to run in Debt, as a Nation, for the current Service of the Year, that is for what is requiſite to ſupport our Government; why do we boaſt our Riches, or why do we purſue ſuch a Conduct, as muſt draw us into ſo vaſt an Expence, as if we were really rich, muſt ſooner or later render us poor.

Theſe are Queſtions that any Man who thinks a little muſt be tempted to ask, and they are Queſtions that the ableſt of our Politicians, let him think as long as he will, can never anſwer to any reaſonable Man's Satisfaction.

But if all that has been ſaid ſhould go for nothing, if we muſt lay aſide all Thoughts of our own Affairs, all Concern for our own Condition, all Regard for the Fate of our Poſterity, in order to ſecure the Ballance of Power, and preſerve Things from going to Wreck on the Continent; I ſay if this be all we have to think of, let us know why, to what Purpoſe, and how long we are to think of this. I have already ſhewn, that with Reſpect to the Intereſt of *Great Britain*, we have generally ſpeaking run into great Miſtakes, about the Ballance of Power, and by running into theſe Miſtakes,

Miſtakes, have never been able to attain our End, how right ſoever our Intention might have been, if we could have obtained it: and I have ſhewn that our late Meaſures have been grounded on the ſame Miſtake that ruined us formerly. If it be ſaid that we muſt fulfil our Treaties, ſhew us thoſe Treaties, aud let us know what we are to fulfil. It cannot ſurely be thought reaſonable, that we ſhould aſſiſt the Queen of *Hungary*, *totis viribus*, before the *Dutch* are under the ſame Obligation. Let us always act the Part of juſt and faithful Allies, but let us not always act the Part of Principals in every Quarrel; let us not take upon us a greater Share, than if we were Principals it would become us to take; let us not do our own Parts, and at the ſame time pay other Powers for doing theirs. Above all let us know what is to be done. We have been told by great Authority that we might, laſt Campaign, have hurt the *French* more if we would; let us hear the Reaſons why we did not, let us know who we are to hurt, or whether we are to hurt any Body next Campaign. Let us know what will content us, and whether having that, will not create a new War. The Queen of *Hungary* gave up *Sileſia* to the King of *Pruſſia*; ſhe now holds *Bavaria* as an equivalent for *Sileſia*. Let us know if the King of *Pruſſia* is content with that, or whether if ſhe quits this Equivalent, he will concur in procuring her another; if not, what are we doing? If ſhe muſt ſet down at laſt without an Equivalent, becauſe the *German* Princes and States would think her too powerful if ſhe had one, why ſhould not Things be now adjuſted on the beſt Terms poſſible, without running us into any further Expence? In the two laſt Wars we had ſome Rules to go by, why ſhould we not have ſome Rule in this? Theſe

are Queſtions fit to be asked, and fit to be anſwered; ſince it is moſt evident, that if we go on, but a very few Years, at the Rate we have done for ſome Years paſt, the Event muſt be fatal to us, whatever becomes of the Ballance of Power.

As I have all along made it my Buſineſs to avoid invidious Topicks, ſo I have been particularly careful not to enter into the preſent Grand Diſpute, about the Expediency of employing *Hanoverian* Troops. It is very natural for Princes to have a warm Affection for their hereditary Subjects, and ſuch as they conceive particularly bound to them by the Ties not only of Duty, but Affection. This was the Caſe of the Emperor *Charles* V. who preferring his Countrymen, the *Flemings*, to the higheſt Offices civil and military, provoked a Rebellion in *Spain*, the ſuppreſſing of which proved the Ruin of the *Spaniſh* Liberties. A ſtrong Partiality in Favour of their Arch-Ducal Subjects, was no leſs fatal to the *German* Branch of the *Auſtrian* Line, for while they treated the *Hungarians* as Vaſſals, and the *Bohemians* as Slaves, they were in reality Maſters of neither; but on the contrary, ſtrong Inſtances of a certain and eternal Truth, that exceſſive Dominion inſtead of being the Source, is in reality the Bane of Power; which further appears by the mighty Stand made by the Queen of *Hungary*, not in Virtue of her Authority over the Bodies, but of her Influence over the Minds of her Subjects. Partiality of the ſame Nature proved very deſtructive to our *James* I. who was extravagantly fond of his *Scottiſh* Countrymen, by which he loſt the Hearts of his *Engliſh* Subjects, and ſcattered thoſe Seeds of Diſcontent, which afterwards grew up into a Harveſt of Rebellion. Yet it muſt be allowed, that there is on the other Hand, very

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POSTSCRIPT.

THERE are ſome People who are ſtill enamour'd of the old Syſtem of *German* Politicks, and therefore would fain perſuade us, that the Face of Things is entirely chang'd; that ſince the Elevation of the Grand Duke of *Tuſcany* to the Imperial Dignity; we have the Emperor and Empire entirely with us, the whole Weight of the *Germanick* Body, acting in Favour of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and conſequently moſt of thoſe Difculties removed, which are ſet forth in the foregoing Pages, and they have gone ſo far, as with an Air of Inſult and Pride, to ſay they wiſhed to hear what the Author of this Treatiſe could ſay to the contrary; which becauſe I am loth to have *Fugam fecit* impreſſed upon my Grave-Stone, I am ready to comply with, and for the Reader's Eaſe and my own, ſhall digeſt what I have to ſay upon this Subject into very few Words.

In the firſt Place then, I deny the Premiſes; and in the ſecond, I declare I am not ſatisfied as to the Concluſion; that is in expreſs Terms, and in plain *Engliſh*, I do not think that it is ſo clear, that by the new Election, the whole Weight of the Empire will be brought to act in Favour of the

the Houſe of *Auſtria*; or ſuppoſing the Thing ſo to be, it is not at all clear to me, that even in this Caſe, we ought to reſume the old Syſtem, and ſuffer ourſelves to relapſe into following *German*, rather than *Britiſh* Politicks. How far I have Reaſon, and, which is even a ſtronger Thing, Facts on my Side, is what I am to ſhew, and this, as I promiſed, ſhall be done very ſuccinctly.

The Election of the Grand Duke, however it might be conſider'd elſewhere, was indubitably conſider'd in *Germany*, as the moſt effectual Means of reſtoring the Peace and Tranquility of that Country, a Thing of infinite Importance to its Inhabitants, and which therefore they had a right to conſider before all Things. Yet as ſimple, as ſelf-evident as this Propoſition may ſeem, it is a Fact notorious to all the World, that the Members of the *Germanick* Body did not fall into it with that Unanimity, or purſue it with that Zeal and Reſolution that might have been expected; on the contrary a great deal of Pains were neceſſary, and a great deal of Pains were taken to bring this Meaſure about; and I think, without Injury to Truth it may be affirmed, that there was not a ſingle Power that had any influence in this Buſineſs, but what expected and received Gratification, and Satisfaction as to their particular Intereſts, before they concurred in it; from whence I infer, that what the great Friends of *German* Politicks boaſt of here, as the Effects of publick Spirit, and magnify as a noble Effort of *German* Patriotiſm, was in reality, and at the Bottom no more than the Reſult of an aggregate Body of private Views, united to bring about this Point, by thoſe who had taken upon themſelves to be the Curators of *Germany*, if I may be allowed the Expreſſion, and to oblige the Princes and States of

that Country by lucrative Motives to purſue their own Good.

But after all that was done, or that could be done in this Reſpect, this Project was brought to bear in a very imperfect Manner, for the Event is not ſo old, but that it may be well remember'd; this famous Election was not unanimous, and was ſo far from anſwering the Purpoſe at firſt, that it actually heighten'd the Flame of War, and for a Time increaſed the Diſtreſſes of *Germany*; before this neceſſary Unanimity could be produced. On the one Hand the Imperial Court was inflexible; no Terms were to be granted to the King of *Pruſſia*; no Relaxation given to the Elector *Palatine*; and on the other, neither of thoſe Powers were to be frighted, even by the powerful Confederacy of *Warſaw*, into giving their Conſent to the Election, till they had a Compenſation, or a Conſideration for giving that Conſent. The bad Conſequences of this Conduct on both Sides, which for the preſent defeated all the great and good Deſigns, it was expected the Election ſhould have brought about; appearing plainly no Pains were ſpared to make the Parties concern'd, ſenſible of all this, and to bring about by fair Means an Event ſo neceſſary to their private as well as publick Intereſts; but in vain; for tho' *Pruſſia* liſten'd to our Reaſons, yet at *Vienna* they were rejected; and a much greater ſtreſs laid on the Heroiſm of Prince *Charles*, than on the Mediation of *Great-Britain*.

In the mean Time the common Cauſe ſuffer'd on every Side, and in the ſevereſt Degree. In *Italy*, the common Enemy ſhut up the King of *Sardinia* in his Capital; in the *Low-Countries*, the *French* after penetrating the Barrier, took Winter-Quarters at the Gates of *Bruſſels*; and a Rebel-

Rebellion was ſet on Foot here, that put it out of our Power to mind any Body's Concerns but our own. Theſe were the bleſſed Effects of the War in *Sileſia*, and the firſt Fruits of that Firmneſs ſhewn by the Imperial Court, for purſuing what ſhe took to be her own Intereſt; while in Conſequence of the Election, a kind of Neutrality took Place upon the *Rhine*; which at once ſatisfied the Miniſters of *Vienna*, and ſerv'd the Purpoſes of the Miniſtry at *Verſailles*. Let any Man deny theſe Facts that can, and let any Man who owns them ſay, what good accrued to the common Cauſe, by the Emperor's Election, before the Peace of *Dreſden*.

That Peace was entirely owing, firſt to the Succeſs, and next to the Moderation of the King of *Pruſſia*. He enter'd into a Convention with us, upon Terms that were thought fit for him, when threatned by a powerful Confederacy, and oblig'd to truſt the Safety of his Capital to its own Militia. He was content with theſe Terms, when he treated a new Peace in the Capital of one of thoſe Powers, who rejected thoſe Terms, and eclips'd the Reputation of his Arms by the Readineſs with which he laid them down. The whole Affair was finiſhed in three Days; in the firſt, he appear'd the greateſt Soldier; in the ſecond, the ableſt Stateſman; in the laſt, the trueſt Patriot that *Germany* has ſeen. To him we owe the giving the laſt Sanction to the Election, and the putting the Affairs of *Germany* on that Foot, upon which they ſtand at preſent, and what that is, we are bound next to enquire.

That the Emperor is acknowledg'd by all the Princes and States of *Germany*, is true; that there is an Army of Obſervation, ſuch as it is, is likewiſe true; but that the Empire ſtill continues

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Neuter, and is diſpoſed ſo to continue, is as true. If *France* ſhould content herſelf with being upon the Defenſive in the next Campaign, I dare prophecy, that the Troops of the Empire will neither be brought to paſs the *Rhine*, nor to act in Conjunction with the *Imperialiſts* if they ſhould paſs it; ſo that all Hopes of a Diverſion on that Side; are very indifferently founded; and we know by Experience, that unleſs *France* is attacked on all Sides, it ſignifies very little to attack her on any Side; and if ſhe can make Terms in *Italy*, the Allies will not be able to do any great Matter on the only Side which will then lie open. So that upon a ſerious Review of this Matter, it appears the Election may have been a right Meaſure in *German* Politicks, as it gives Peace and Quiet to that Country; but hitherto it cannot be ſaid to have given any great Weight to the common Cauſe, or procured any great Aſſiſtance to the Houſe of *Auſtria*.

The *Hanoverians* that are in *Flanders*, are there independant of that Election; the *Heſſians* in our Service are likewiſe independant of that Election; when the *Saxons* ſhall march, it will be upon Terms independant of that Election; and even the Troops of the Biſhop of *Bamberg* and *Wurtzbourg*, are in the Pay of the *Dutch* independant of that Election. On the other hand, the King of *Pruſſia* is arming with a View not known; the Elector *Palatine* is arming with a View that is very much ſuſpected; the Duke of *Wirtemburgh* has refuſed to march his Contingent, ſo much as to awe the *French*; and the Operations of the Troops of the Circles, are yet under Deliberation, and will be ſo after the Campaign begins. What then becomes of the Weight of *Germany*, where is the Acceſſion of new Allies to the common Cauſe, or to the Support

port of the Houſe of *Auſtria?* Let him who knows it ſpeak.

But now to the ſecond Point, let us take it for granted, ſince undoubtedly it can never be proved, that we ſhall have the Emperor and Empire in the remaining Part of the War on our Side. Have we not had them before, and have they ever acted at their own Expence? Will any Advantage accrue to the common Cauſe, from ſtiling the *Auſtrian* Troops *Imperial?* If not, what have we got: They could not march before, till they were put in Motion by the Maritime Powers, and they tell us from the *Hague*, that this is the Caſe now. The *Dutch* ſay that they advanced a round Sum themſelves, nay, and that they forc'd other People to advance Money too, before General *Grune* could move a Step, though *Bruſſels* was beſieged; which was taken, almoſt as ſoon as the Subſidies produced the Motion of the *Imperialiſts*. If, therefore, after all, the Emperor and the Empire muſt be paid by the Maritime Powers for doing their own Buſineſs, we may be ſaid to have augmented our Auxiliaries; but not ſurely to have increaſed the Number of our Allies; and with Reſpect to Auxiliaries, the Maritime Powers had more than they could well pay before. Thus then, the very expenſive Meaſure of the Election has put us, upon this Suppoſition, into a way of being at a ſtill greater Expence, if we will have it do us any good, and this is the plain *Engliſh* of making a Puſh; raiſing vaſt Supplies at once, and bringing all the Iron of *Germany* into the Field——in Exchange for *Britiſh* Gold—— if it could be had.

This is a fair and true Repreſentation of the Matter, a Draught of *German* Politicks after the Life; this is that great Scheme, which our ſhort-

lived

lived Miniſtry was to have undertaken; this is that Scheme which will be boaſted of as certain and infallible, if it had been purſued, and this in fine, I think I have demonſtrated to be as wild and as impracticable a Scheme as the former. And therefore I ſhall conclude, with gratifying my Enemies ſo far, as to concur with them in Opinion, that the Second Edition of *German* Politicks, is not only as bad, but much worſe than the Firſt; and may the Guardian Genius of GREAT-BRITAIN, defend us from ever ſeeing a Third.

FINIS.

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